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51 
BARGAINED JUSTICE: PLEA-BARGAINING’S INNOCENCE PROBLEM 
AND THE BRADY SAFETY-VALVE 
 
Lucian E. Dervan 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On January 17, 1959, James Zeno walked deliberately up three flights of 
stairs and knocked on the door of Beatrice Lynumn’s Chicago apartment.2 Zeno, 
who had been arrested by Chicago police for possession of narcotics earlier that 
day, was acting as an informant in return for a promise of leniency.3 Lynumn 
opened the door and Zeno walked inside.4 After a brief interaction, Zeno left the 
apartment with a package of marijuana under his arm.5 
A few minutes later, Lynumn was in custody.6 Despite the strong evidence 
provided by Zeno, she vehemently professed her innocence as police filed into her 
                                                 
 © 2012 Lucian E. Dervan. Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University 
School of Law, and former member of the King & Spalding LLP Special Matters and 
Government Investigations Team. Special thanks to Professors Marc Miller, Ellen Podgor, 
Christopher Slobogin, Andrew Leipold, Russell Covey, Jenny Roberts, Nancy Levit, 
Vanessa Edkins, Paul McGreal, Peter Alexander, William Schroeder, Christopher Behan, 
Nathan Sales, Luke Milligan, and Lea Johnston for their valuable comments regarding 
earlier versions of this article and to my research assistants Angela Boley and Elizabeth 
Boratto. Thanks also to Southern Illinois University School of Law for providing the 
summer research grant that funded this research and to the Southeastern Association of 
Law Schools (SEALS) for the opportunity to present a draft of this paper at its 2010 
conference. 
2 See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 529 (1963). 
3 See id. On January 17, 1959, three Chicago police officers arrested James Zeno for 
unlawful possession of narcotics. They took him to a district police station. There they told 
him that if he “would set somebody up for them, they would go light on him.” He agreed to 
“cooperate” and telephoned [Lynumn], telling her that he was coming over to her 
apartment. Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id.  
6 See id. at 529–30. Officer Sims testified as follows: 
 
He called Beatrice and said he had left his glasses in the apartment; she 
opened the door and as she came out into the hall, I was standing in the common 
hall, in the vestibule part with the door partly closed. As she walked down the 
hallway toward Zeno, I opened the door and stepped into the hallway. I told her 
she was under arrest and I grabbed her by her hands, both hands. At this point, I 
told her that she had been set up, that she had just made a sale and I showed her 
the package. 
 
See id. at 529 n.1. 
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apartment.7 At that moment, the issue of most concern to Lynumn was not her guilt 
or innocence, however, but the fate of her children, ages three and four.8 The 
concern was particularly acute given that the children’s father had passed away and 
Lynumn was raising them on her own.9 Perhaps seeing an opportunity, the police 
began their interrogation right there in the apartment.10 
 
Then he [the police officer] started telling me I could get 10 years and 
the children could be taken away, and after I got out they would be taken 
away and strangers would have them, and if I could cooperate he would 
see they weren’t; and he would recommend leniency and I had better do 
what they told me if I wanted to see my kids again.11 
 
According to Lynumn, the offer of leniency and the belief that she would be 
able to remain with her children created an overwhelming motivation to 
cooperate.12 As a result, she confessed to the police in her apartment. Lynumn later 
stated, “[t]he only reason I had for admitting [guilt] to the police was the hope of 
saving myself from going to jail and being taken away from my children.”13 
Lynumn later recanted her admission of guilt and proceeded to trial where, 
despite her renewed proclamations of innocence, the confession was entered into 
evidence.14 Rather than refute Lynumn’s account of the events, the police officers 
involved admitted that the events had transpired largely as the defendant had 
described.15 Based on the weight of her earlier admission of guilt and Zeno’s 
testimony, Lynumn was convicted and sentenced to not less than ten years in 
prison.16  Just as the officers had accurately predicted would occur during her 
                                                 
7 See id. at 530. 
8 Id. at 531.  
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 See id. at 531–32.  
13 Id. at 532.  
14 See id. at 529. 
15 See id. at 532. According to one officer: 
 
I asked her who the clothing belonged to. She said they were her 
children’s. I asked how many she had and she said 2. I asked her where they 
were or who took care of them. She said the children were over at the mother’s 
or mother-in-law. I asked her how did she take care of herself and she said she 
was on ADC. I told her that if we took her into the station and charged her with 
the offense, that the ADC would probably be cut off and also that she would 
probably lose custody of her children. That was not before I said if she 
cooperated, it would go light on her. It was during that conversation. 
 
Id. at 533. 
16 See id. at 529. 
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arrest, Lynumn was sentenced to a decade behind bars for challenging the state to 
prove her guilt in court rather than cooperating in her own prosecution.17 
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court took up the issue of the 
admissibility of Lynumn’s confession. 18  In a unanimous opinion, the Justices 
concluded that the confession was inadmissible as a coerced, rather than voluntary, 
statement.19 The Court stated, “[i]t is thus abundantly clear that the petitioner’s oral 
confession was made only after the police had told her that state financial aid for 
her infant children would be cut off, and her children taken from her, if she did not 
‘cooperate.’ These threats were made while she was encircled in her apartment by 
three police officers and a twice convicted felon who had purportedly ‘set her 
up.’”20 Based on precedent establishing that confessions must be both voluntary 
and intelligent, the Court stated that where the defendant’s “will was overborne at 
the time [s]he confessed,” the confession cannot be deemed the product of a 
“rational intellect and a free will.”21 The court concluded that it was a blatant 
violation of the United States Constitution for the police to threaten Lynumm with 
the reality of the situation if she failed to cooperate through confession, even 
though they were correct when they told her that she faced a possible sentence of 
ten years in prison which would result in her losing custody of her children.22 
In 2004, just over forty years after the Lynumn case, another mother of two 
small children was brought before the criminal justice system, and, once again, she 
was threatened with ten years in prison unless she agreed to cooperate.23 Also like 
Lynumn, the threat of ten years in prison meant that her children would be without 
both parents.24 As might be expected, the defendant once again acquiesced to the 
demands of her accusers, yet this time the Supreme Court was silent.25 
Lea Fastow served as Director and Assistant Treasurer of Corporate Finance 
at the now infamous Texas energy trading company Enron from 1991 until 1997.26 
Her husband, Andrew Fastow, was also an integral part of the corporation and 
served as Chief Financial Officer from 1997 until the corporation’s collapse in 
                                                 
17 See id. at 531 (“Then he started telling me I could get 10 years and the children 
could be taken away . . .”). 
18 See id. at 528. 
19 Id. at 534. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960)).  
22 See id. (“We think it clear that a confession made under such circumstances must 
be deemed not voluntary, but coerced.”). 
23  See Michelle S. Jacobs, Loyalty’s Reward—A Felony Conviction: Recent 
Prosecutions of High-Status Female Offenders, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 843, 857 (2006); 
Mary Flood, Lea Fastow in Plea-Bargain Talks; Former Enron CFO’s Wife Could Get 5-
Month Term but Deal Faces Hurdles, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 7, 2003, at A1. 
24 See Jacobs, supra note 23, at 857. 
25 See Mary Flood, Wife of Former Enron Chief Financial Officer Begins Prison 
Sentence in Houston, HOUS. CHRON., July 13, 2004, at A1.  
26 Jacobs, supra note 23, at 856. 
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2001. 27  Although Lea Fastow was a stay-at-home mother raising two small 
children in 2001, federal investigators determined that she had known of her 
husband’s fraudulent financial dealings and had even assisted him in perpetrating 
the frauds.28  In response, the government indicted Lea Fastow along with her 
husband, who had already been charged with ninety-eight counts of criminal 
conduct.29 Lea Fastow’s indictment contained six counts, including conspiracy to 
commit wire fraud and defraud the United States, money laundering conspiracy, 
aiding and abetting, and filing a false tax return.30  
Conviction on all six counts of the indictment would result in a prison term of 
up to ten years, but the government was more interested in persuading Lea Fastow 
to cooperate than in convicting her.31 As a result, the government offered her a 
deal.32  In return for confessing her guilt in court, the prosecution would only 
charge her with a single count of filing a false tax return and the government 
would recommend a sentence of one year of supervised release.33 The deal also 
included an agreement that Lea Fastow and her husband, who also intended to 
plead guilty in return for leniency, would not have to serve their prison sentences 
simultaneously, thus ensuring their children would always have one parent at 
                                                 
27 Id. 
28 See id. at 856–57. 
 
During the time in question, Andrew Fastow and Michael Kopper created 
several Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) to hold off-balance sheet treatment of 
assets held by Enron. . . . Ms. Fastow assisted with concealing the fraudulent 
nature of two of the SPEs. In both cases, Ms. Fastow accepted “gifts” in her 
name and in the names of her children, knowing that the gifts were kickbacks. 
In another instance, the Fastows were attempting to hide the fact that Ms. 
Fastow’s father was used as an “independent” third party of RADR. When the 
Fastows realized that the father’s ownership would trigger a reporting 
requirement, they had him pull out of the deal. Ms. Fastow convinced her father 
to file a false tax return in an effort to continue hiding their involvement in the 
SPE. 
 
Id.; see also Flood, supra note 23, at A1. 
29 See Indictment, United States v. Fastow (S.D. Tex. 2004) (Cr. No. H-03-150), 
available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usleafstw43003 
ind.pdf (last visited July 13, 2010). 
30 Id. 
31 The ten-year sentence is calculated using the 2002 sentencing guidelines for fraud. 
Beginning with a base offense level of six points, Fastow would have received twenty 
points for a $17 million loss and four points for an offense involving more than fifty 
people. A defendant with no previous criminal history and thirty points has a sentencing 
range between 97–121 months. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 
(2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2002_guidelines/2002_manual.cfm. 
32 See Flood, supra note 23, at A1. 
33 See Bruce Zucker, Settling Federal Criminal Cases in the Post-Enron Era: The 
Role of the Court and Probation Office in Plea Bargaining Federal White Collar Cases, 6 
FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2004). 
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home.34 As the lead prosecutor in the case stated, “[t]he Fastows’ children can be 
taken into account in deciding when Andrew Fastow will begin serving his 
sentence. There is no reason for the government, when it can [avoid it], to have a 
husband and wife serve their sentences at the same time.”35 
For Lea Fastow, the reality of her situation removed any free will she might 
have had to weigh her options.36 With two small children at home and the prospect 
that she and her husband might both be in prison at the same time, the decision to 
accept the offer was made for her.37 As one family friend stated, “[i]t’s a matter of 
willing to risk less when it’s for her children than she would risk if it were just for 
herself.” 38  As such, she succumbed to the pressure to confess her guilt and 
accepted the deal.39 
Eventually, the judge forced the government to revise its offer because he 
believed five months was too lenient.40 As a result, Lea Fastow pleaded guilty to a 
misdemeanor tax charge and was sentenced to one year in prison. Nevertheless, the 
agreement to confess her guilt in return for a promise of leniency lessened her 
sentence by nine years and ensured her children would not be without a parent.41 
As promised, Andrew Fastow was not required to report to prison for his offenses 
until after Lea Fastow was released.42 
                                                 
34 Jacobs, supra note 23, at 859 (“During the renegotiation of the second plea, it was 
widely reported that Ms. Fastow was interested in a plea that would allow her children to 
stay at home with one parent while the other was incarcerated, rather than running the risk 
that both parents would be incarcerated at the same time. The government apparently 
acquiesced to this request.”). 
35 Mary Flood & Clifford Pugh, Lea Fastow Expresses “Regret” at Sentencing; Wife 
of ex-Enron CFO Faces Years in Prison, HOUS. CHRON., May 7, 2004, at A1. 
36 See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (“[T]he question in each case is whether 
the defendant’s will was overborne at the time he confessed. If so, the confession cannot be 
deemed ‘the product of a rational intellect and a free will.’” (citations omitted) (quoting 
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960))). 
37 See Greg Farrell & Jayne O’Donnell, Plea Deals Appear Close for Fastows; Could 
Mean Task Force on Verge of Filing More Charges, USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 2004, at B.01 
(“One of the reasons that Lea Fastow wants to limit her jail time to five months is that she 
and her husband have two young children, and they’re trying to structure their pleas so 
they’re not both in jail at the same time.”). 
38 Flood, supra note 23, at A1 (“A family friend previously said Lea Fastow is willing 
to consider pleading guilty and forgoing a chance to tell her side to a jury because it would 
be better for her two small children and could ensure they would not be without a parent at 
home.”). 
39 See Mary Flood, Fastows to Plead Guilty Today; Feds Now Focus on Skilling, Lay, 
HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 14, 2004, at A1 (“The plea bargains for the Fastows, who said they 
wanted to be sure their two children are not left parentless, have been in limbo for more 
than a week.”). 
40 See Farrell & O’Donnell, supra note 37, at B.01 (“U.S. Judge David Hittner told 
Lea Fastow Wednesday that he refused to be locked in to the five-month prison sentence 
that her lawyers had negotiated with prosecutors.”); Flood, supra note 25, at A1. 
41 See Farrell & O’Donnell, supra note 37, at B.01; Flood, supra note 25, at A1.  
42 See Flood, supra note 25, at A1. 
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In a 1942 Supreme Court case, the Justices wrote, “a plea of guilty coerced by 
a federal law enforcement officer is no more consistent with due process than a 
conviction supported by a coerced confession.”43 Yet Lea Fastow’s guilty plea, the 
product of the same threats the Supreme Court found coercive forty years before, 
was simply assumed by everyone involved to be constitutional. This type of 
assumption seems well supported, as Lea Fastow’s guilty plea represents just one 
of hundreds of thousands of similiar deals entered into by prosecutors and 
defendants every year in the American criminal justice system.44 The first question 
this Article seeks to answer, therefore, is how and why the Supreme Court shifted 
from being a protector of coerced defendants to being a supporter of the plea 
bargaining machine.45 The answer involves a great compromise by the Justices in 
1970, a compromise necessitated by strains on the criminal justice system resulting 
from the additional rights afforded to defendants during the Warren Court’s due 
process revolution and the crushing and ever-increasing number of criminal 
prosecutions in America.46 The great compromise was to allow prosecutors and 
defendants to bargain for justice in hopes this might alleviate pressures on the 
system while simultaneously benefitting clearly guilty defendants willing to reap 
an advantage in return for an admission of guilt.47 
Unfortunately, the plea bargaining system has not evolved as the Justices had 
hoped.48 Rather than a system in which guilty defendants bargain for a mutually 
beneficial outcome and innocent defendants wage forward toward trial in hopes of 
acquittal, the plea bargaining system has come to engulf almost everyone.49 Today, 
the incentives to bargain are powerful enough to force even an innocent defendant 
to falsely confess guilt in hopes of leniency and in fear of reprisal.50 The second 
question this Article seeks to answer, therefore, is whether, in 1970, the Supreme 
Court was willing to permit the incentives offered for bargaining to become so 
powerful as to induce even innocent defendants to plead guilty.51  
                                                 
43 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942). 
44  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS, at fig.C (2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/ 
Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2009/SBTOC09.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2012) (stating 
that in 2009, 96.3% of federal defendants pleaded guilty). For a discussion of scholarship 
on plea bargaining generally and the debate over whether plea bargaining is an appropriate 
part of our criminal justice system, see Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of 
Plea Bargaining in United States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717 (2006). 
45 See infra Part II (examining the Supreme Court’s great plea bargaining compromise 
of 1970). 
46 See infra Part II.B (examining the reasons for the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United State v. Brady). 
47 See infra Part II.B. 
48 See infra Part III (examining plea bargaining’s innocence problem). 
49 See infra Part III.A (examining the prevalence of innocent defendants pleading 
guilty). 
50 See infra Part III. 
51 See infra Part III.B (examining the Supreme Court’s safety-valve in United States v. 
Brady). 
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In answering this question, this Article proposes that the Supreme Court in 
Brady specifically contemplated the possibility that prosecutors would utilize the 
plea bargaining system in an impermissible manner and, as a result, created both a 
safety-valve and a litmus test for a failure of the safety-valve.52 The Brady safety-
valve limits the amount of pressure that may be asserted against defendants by 
prohibiting prosecutors from offering incentives in return for guilty pleas that are 
so coercive as to overbear defendants’ abilities to act freely.53 The number of 
innocent defendants who are induced to falsely confess their guilt is a litmus test to 
determine when prosecutors have applied excessive pressure and the safety-valve 
has failed.54 The Brady Court stated that if the plea bargaining system began to 
operate in a manner resulting in a significant number of innocent defendants 
pleading guilty, the Court would reexamine the constitutionality of bargained 
justice. 55  The significant innocence problem that plea bargaining has today 
indicates that the Brady safety-valve has failed and, as a result, the constitutionality 
of modern day plea bargaining is in great doubt.56 
In Part I, this Article examines the rise of plea bargaining in America and 
explores the forces behind this jurisprudential revolution.57 In Part II, this Article 
analyzes Supreme Court precedent regarding plea bargaining dating back to the 
1800s. 58  In so doing, this Article demonstrates that the Supreme Court was 
strongly opposed to bargained justice for over a century prior to its great 
compromise of 1970.59  Finally, in Part III, this Article examines a significant 
portion of the Supreme Court’s great compromise that has gone largely unnoticed 
by scholars, practitioners, and judges.60 The Supreme Court created a safety-valve 
in 1970 to ensure that the pressures placed on defendants to plead guilty would 
never reach impermissible levels.61 As this Part demonstrates, there is a significant 
innocence problem with plea bargaining today. This being the case, the Brady 
safety-valve may not be working and, if so, defendants, both innocent and guilty, 
are being offered unconstitutional incentives to confess.62 
 
                                                 
52 See infra Part III.B. 
53 See infra Part III.B. 
54 See infra Part III.B. 
55 See infra Part III.B. 
56  See infra notes 257–261 (examining the literature regarding plea bargaining’s 
current innocence problem). 
57 See infra Part I.  
58 See infra Part II.  
59 See infra Part II. 
60 See infra Part III. 
61 See infra Part III. For purposes of this article, the terms “innocent” and “innocence” 
are used to refer to any defendant who would not have been convicted at trial. Of course, 
this is not to say a defendant is necessarily free of moral culpability or responsibility for the 
charged conduct. Nevertheless, the terms “innocent” and “innocence” herein serve as terms 
to discuss those who are not criminally liable in the eyes of the law. 
62 See infra Part III. 
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I.  THE RISE OF THE PLEA BARGAINING MACHINE 
 
Before delving deeply into Supreme Court plea bargaining precedent, it is 
important to understand the rise and operation of the modern day plea bargaining 
machine. Of particular significance is the fact that plea bargaining began its rise to 
dominance well before it had been approved as a form of justice by the Supreme 
Court in 1970. In fact, plea bargaining began to grow in popularity during periods 
of American history when Supreme Court precedent specifically found the practice 
of offering incentives for defendants to plead guilty unconstitutional.63 
 
A.  The Historical Rise of Plea Bargaining 
 
The evolution of plea bargaining into a force that affects over 95 percent of 
defendants in the American criminal justice system took place mainly in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.64 While the right to plead guilty dates back to 
English common law traditions, a new phenomenon began to appear in America 
shortly after the Civil War. It was during this period that state courts began 
witnessing an influx of appellate cases dealing with apparent “bargains” between 
defendants and prosecutors.65 With resounding frequency, these early experiments 
with bargained justice were rejected by the judiciary as demonstrated by the case 
excerpts below.66 
 
The least surprise of influence causing [the defendant] to plead guilty 
when he had any defense at all should be sufficient cause to permit a 
change of the plea from guilty to not guilty.67 
 
                                                 
63 See infra Part II.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s rejection of bargained justice 
prior to 1970). 
64 See John Baldwin & Michael McConville, Plea Bargaining and Plea Negotiation 
in England, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 287, 287–91 (1979); Lucian E. Dervan, Plea 
Bargaining’s Survival: Financial Crimes Plea Bargaining, A Continued Triumph in a 
Post-Enron World, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 451, 478 (2007); Mark H. Haller, Plea Bargaining: 
The Nineteenth Century Context, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 273, 273 (1979) (“[Alschuler and 
Friedman] agree that plea bargaining was probably nonexistent before 1800, began to 
appear during the early or mid-nineteenth century, and became institutionalized as a 
standard feature of American urban criminal courts in the last third of the nineteenth 
century.”); John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 261, 261–62 (1979); Lynn M. Mather, Comments on the History of 
Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 281, 81–83 (1979). 
65 See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
19 (1979) (“It was only after the Civil War that cases of plea bargaining began to appear in 
American appellate court reports.”). 
66 See id. at 19–21. 
67 Id. at 20. 
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No sort of pressure can be permitted to bring the party to forego any right 
or advantage however slight. The law will not suffer the least weight to 
be put in the scale against him.68 
 
[W]hen there is reason to believe that the plea has been entered through 
inadvertence . . . and mainly from the hope that the punishment to which 
the accused would otherwise be exposed may thereby be mitigated, the 
Court should be indulgent in permitting the plea to be withdrawn.69 
 
Despite these early defeats for plea bargaining, the idea of bargained justice 
did not die. On the contrary, though infrequent by today’s standards, plea 
bargaining continued to exist in the local and district court systems.70 
By the turn of the century, plea bargaining was on the rise, but not because it 
served mutually beneficial considerations of prosecutors and defendants or because 
it advanced judicial economy. 71  Plea bargaining began to thrive in the early 
twentieth century because judges and prosecutors began accepting bribes from 
defendants in return for “plea agreements” that guaranteed reduced sentences. 
According to Professor Albert Alschuler, “[t]he gap between these judicial 
denunciations of plea bargaining [in the late nineteenth century] and the practices 
of many urban courts at the turn of the century and thereafter was apparently 
extreme. In these courts, striking political corruption apparently contributed to a 
flourishing practice of plea bargaining.”72 
While corruption introduced plea bargaining to the broader legal community, 
it was the rise in criminal cases before and during Prohibition that spurred its 
growth and made it a legal necessity.73 Between the early twentieth century and 
1925, the number of cases in the federal system resulting in pleas of guilty rose 
sharply from 50 to 90 percent.74 In return for defendants’ assistance in moving a 
                                                 
68 Id. 
69  Id. In an 1877 Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, the court stated that plea 
bargaining was “hardly, if at all, distinguishable in principle from a direct sale of justice.” 
Id. at 21 (quoting Wight v. Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344, 354 (1877)). 
70 See id. at 22. 
71 See id. at 24. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. at 27; GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA 
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 210–12 (2003). 
 
[F]ederal prosecutions under the Prohibition Act terminated in 1930 had 
become nearly eight times as many as the total of all pending federal 
prosecutions in 1914. In a number of urban districts the enforcement agencies 
maintain that the only practicable way of meeting this situation with the existing 
machinery of federal courts . . . is for the United States Attorneys to make 
bargains with defendants or their counsel whereby defendants plead guilty to 
minor offenses and escape with light penalties . . . . 
 
Alschuler, supra note 65, at 32. 
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flood of cases through an overwhelmed system, they were often permitted to plead 
guilty to lesser charges or given lighter sentences. 75  As Prohibition was 
extinguished, the United States continued its drive to create new criminal laws, a 
phenomenon that only added to the courts’ growing case loads and the pressure to 
continue to use bargaining to move cases through the system.76 
By 1967, the American Bar Association (ABA) was proclaiming the benefits 
of plea bargaining, even though it had not, as of yet, been specifically approved by 
the Supreme Court.77 The ABA stated: 
 
[A] high proportion of pleas of guilty and nolo contendere does benefit 
the system. Such pleas tend to limit the trial process to deciding real 
disputes and, consequently, to reduce the need for funds and personnel. 
If the number of judges, courtrooms, court personnel and counsel for 
prosecution and defense were to be increased substantially, the funds 
necessary for such increases might be diverted from elsewhere in the 
criminal justice process. Moreover, the limited use of the trial process 
for those cases in which the defendant has grounds for contesting the 
matter of guilty aids in preserving the meaningfulness of the 
presumption of innocence.78 
 
By the time the Supreme Court agreed that plea bargaining was an available 
form of justice in 1970, plea bargaining’s rise to dominance was already complete. 
The Brady decision was delivered in the shadows of a force that led 90 percent of 
                                                 
74 See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 27 (“By 1925, the percentage of convictions by 
guilty plea had reached almost 90 . . . .”). 
75 See id. at 28 (“The rewards associated with pleas of guilty were manifested not only 
in the lesser offenses of which guilty-plea defendants were convicted but also in the lighter 
sentences that they received.”). 
76 See id. at 33 (“Dean Pound observed that ‘of one hundred thousand persons arrested 
in Chicago in 1912, more than one half were held for violation of legal precepts which did 
not exist twenty-five years before.’”); see also Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, 
Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1155, 
1156–61 (2005) (discussing the relationship between broadening legal rules and plea 
bargaining); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505, 519–20 (2001) (discussing the influence of broader laws on the rate of plea 
bargaining); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal 
Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 129 (2005) (“Changes in federal sentencing 
practices during the 1980s and 1990s increased the certainty and size of the penalty for 
going to trial, and mightily influenced the guilty plea and acquittal rates during those 
times.”). 
77 See AM. BAR ASS’N PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS 
RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 2 (1968) [hereinafter ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE]. 
78 Id. 
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criminal defendants in the 1960s to waive their right to trial and confess their guilt 
in court.79 
 
B.  The Force Behind Plea Bargaining’s Rise 
 
As demonstrated in the previous subpart, plea bargaining rose to dominate the 
American criminal justice system in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But 
how did members of the legal system succeeded in making plea bargaining 
attractive to defendants? Today, a general consensus has evolved within plea 
bargaining scholarship that plea bargaining became a dominant force as a result of 
prosecutors gaining increasing power and control in an ever more complex 
criminal justice system. 80  As prosecutors’ powers to both operate within and 
manipulate the system grew, their ability to create incentives for defendants to 
plead guilty also escalated. The key element of this machine, of course, is 
prosecutorial discretion and the ability to select from various criminal statutes with 
significantly different sentences.81 
                                                 
79 Diana Borteck, Pleas for DNA Testing: Why Lawmakers Should Amend State Post-
Conviction DNA Testing Statutes to Apply to Prisoners Who Pled Guilty, 25 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1429, 1439 n.43 (2004) (citing Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where It Matters: 
Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 1 (2002)) (noting 
“that since the 1960s the plea bargaining rate has been around ninety percent”); see ABA 
PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 1–2 (“The plea of guilty 
is probably the most frequent method of conviction in all jurisdictions; in some localities as 
many as 95 per cent of the criminal cases are disposed of in this way.”). Today, guilty pleas 
account for over 95 percent of all federal cases. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 
44, at fig.C.   
80  For instance, through analysis of plea bargaining in Massachusetts, Professor 
George Fisher argues that as the criminal justice system became more sophisticated, 
prosecutors gained the power to use selective charge bargaining to offer reduced sentences 
for those willing to negotiate. See FISHER, supra note 73, at 210 (“[Sentencing Guidelines] 
invest prosecutors with the power, moderated only by the risk of loss at trial, to dictate 
many sentences simply by choosing one set of charges over another.”); Alschuler, supra 
note 65, at 40; Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 13 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 211 (1979); Dervan, supra note 64, at 478. 
81 For a discussion of charge bargaining and its use by prosecutors, see Mary P. 
Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial Perspectives on Federal 
Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1066–67 (2006) 
(“Like most plea agreements in federal or state courts, the standard D.C. federal plea 
agreement starts by identifying the charges to which the defendant will plead guilty and the 
charges or potential charges that the government in exchange agrees not to prosecute.”); 
Joy A. Boyd, Power, Policy, and Practice: The Department of Justice’s Plea Bargaining 
Policy as Applied to the Federal Prosecutor’s Power Under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines, 56 ALA. L. REV. 591, 592 (2004) (“Not only may a prosecutor choose whether 
to pursue any given case, but she also decides which charges to file.”); Jon J. Lambiras, 
White-Collar Crime: Why the Sentencing Disparity Despite Uniform Guidelines?, 30 PEPP. 
L. REV. 459, 512 (2003) (“Charging decisions are a critical sentencing matter and are left 
solely to the discretion of the prosecutor. When determining which charges to bring, 
 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 62 
While prosecutors possessed the ability to control charging decisions and 
sentencing recommendations throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
their power to control the criminal justice system and offer defendants deals 
increased throughout the 1900s.82 For example, as the number of criminal statutes 
grew during the early twentieth century, prosecutors had more choices when 
charging defendants and more discretion when selecting reduced charges in return 
for guilty pleas.83 A further example is the implementation of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines in the last decade of the twentieth century, a tool that 
greatly increased prosecutors’ control of the system and increased their ability to 
force defendants into plea agreements.84 
 
Before the advent of modern sentencing guidelines, both prosecutor 
and judge held some power to bargain without the other’s       
cooperation . . . . Today, sentencing guidelines have recast whole chunks 
of the criminal code in the mold of the old Massachusetts liquor laws. 
By assigning a fixed and narrow penalty range to almost every definable 
offense, sentencing guidelines often empower prosecutors to dictate a 
defendant’s sentence by manipulating the charges. Guidelines have 
unsettled the old balance of bargaining power among prosecutor, judge, 
and defendant by ensuring that the prosecutor, who always had the 
strongest interest in plea bargaining, now has almost unilateral power to 
deal.85 
 
                                                 
prosecutors may often choose from more than one statutory offense.”); Geraldine S. 
Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from Current White Collar 
Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 177 (2004) (“The power of 
the prosecutor to charge is two-fold; the power to indict or not . . . and the power to decide 
what offenses to charge.”). 
82 See FISHER, supra note 73, at 16–17.  
83 See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 32 (“Dean Pound observed that ‘of one hundred 
thousand persons arrested in Chicago in 1912, more than one half were held for violation of 
legal precepts which did not exist twenty-five years before.’”). 
84 See FISHER, supra note 73, at 17. 
85 FISHER, supra note 73, at 17; see also Boyd, supra note 81, at 591–92 (“While the 
main focus on the Sentencing Guidelines appeared to be narrowing judicial discretion in 
sentencing, some critics argued that the Sentencing Guidelines merely shifted the federal 
judge’s discretionary power to federal prosecutors.”); Marc L. Miller, Domination & 
Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1252 (2004) (“The 
overwhelming and dominant fact of the federal sentencing system, beyond the Commission 
and the guidelines and mandatory penalties, is the virtually absolute power the system has 
given prosecutors over federal prosecution and sentencing.”). 
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While defendants also play an important role in the plea bargaining process, 
prosecutors’ control of charging decisions and their influence over sentencing are 
key elements that contributed to the system’s dominance.86 
Prosecutors have been successful in using their increased powers to create 
incentives that attract defendants to plead guilty by structuring plea agreements 
where the sentence a defendant receives in return for pleading guilty is far lower 
than the sentence he or she risks with a loss at trial.87 In a 1981 article on plea 
bargaining, Professor Albert Alschuler wrote of this “sentencing differential” and 
stated, “[c]riminal defendants today plead guilty in overwhelming numbers 
primarily because they perceive that this action is likely to lead to more lenient 
treatment than would follow conviction at trial. A number of studies suggest this 
perception is justified.” 88  Among these studies was an examination by David 
Brereton and Jonathan Casper that analyzed robbery and burglary defendants in 
three California jurisdictions. 89  The results were striking and illustrated that 
defendants who exercised their constitutional right to a trial received significantly 
higher sentences than those who worked with prosecutors to reach an agreement.90 
                                                 
86 See FISHER, supra note 73, at 230 (“[P]lea bargaining grew so entrenched in the 
halls of power that today, though its patrons may divide its spoils in different ways, it can 
grow no more. For plea bargaining has won.”). 
87  See Stephanos Bibas, Bringing Moral Values into a Flawed Plea-Bargaining 
System, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2003) (“The criminal justice system uses large 
sentence discounts to induce guilty pleas. Of course these discounts exert pressure on 
defendants to plead guilty.”); Lucian E. Dervan, The Surprising Lessons from Plea 
Bargaining in the Shadow of Terror, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 239, 242 (2011). Along with 
sentencing differentials, of course, are considerations by the defendant of the likelihood of 
success at trial. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2465 (2004) (“In short, the classic shadow-of-trial model predicts that 
the likelihood of conviction at trial and the likely post-trial sentence largely determine plea 
bargains.”). 
88 Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 
652, 652–56 (1981). Alschuler goes on to state, “Although the empirical evidence is not of 
one piece, the best conclusion probably is that in a great many cases the sentence 
differential in America assumes shocking proportions.” Id. at 654–56; see also Jenia I. 
Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 199, 251 (2006) (“While practitioners disagree about the acceptability of a large 
sentence differential between the post-plea and post-trial sentence, they agree that such a 
differential is common.”). 
89  See David Brereton & Jonathan D. Casper, Does it Pay to Plead Guilty? 
Differential Sentencing and the Functioning of Criminal Courts, 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 45, 
55–59 (1981); see also H. Joo Shin, Do Lesser Pleas Pay?: Accommodations in the 
Sentencing and Parole Process, 1 J. CRIM. JUST. 27, 40 (1973) (finding that charge 
reduction directly results in reduction of the maximum sentence available and indirectly 
results in lesser actual time served). 
90  See Brereton & Casper, supra note 89, at 55–59; see also Daniel Givelber, 
Punishing Protestations of Innocence: Denying Responsibility and Its Consequences, 37 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363, 1382 (2000) (“The differential in sentencing between those who 
plead and those convicted after trial reflects the judgment that defendants who insist upon a 
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Not limiting themselves to a mere observation of sentencing trends, the researchers 
also made an insightful statement regarding the impact of high differentials on the 
rates of plea bargaining. 
 
The point of the preceding discussion is simple enough: when guilty plea 
rates are high, expect to find differential sentencing. We believe that 
recent arguments to the effect that differentials are largely illusory do not 
withstand serious scrutiny, even though this revisionist challenge has 
been valuable in forcing us to examine more closely what is too often 
taken to be self-evidently true.91 
 
Significant differentials, Brereton and Casper argued, are a tool used to increase 
plea bargaining rates by increasing the incentives for negotiation.92 
Thus, plea bargaining’s rise to dominance during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries resulted from prosecutors gaining increased power over the criminal 
justice system and, through such power, the ability to offer increasingly significant 
incentives to those willing to confess their guilt in court. Today, sentencing 
differentials have reached new heights and, as a result, the incentives for 
defendants to plead guilty are greater than at any previous point in the history of 
our criminal justice system.93 It should be no surprise, therefore, that every year 
more than 95 percent of defendants accept the government’s offers of leniency and 
plead guilty rather than risk the consequences of failure at trial.94 
 
                                                 
trial are doing something blameworthy.”); Tung Yin, Not a Rotten Carrot: Using Charges 
Dismissed Pursuant to a Plea Agreement in Sentencing Under the Federal Guidelines, 83 
CALIF. L. REV. 419, 443 (1995) (“Curiously, the arena of plea bargaining pits the concepts 
of duress and consideration against each other: a large sentencing differential makes it 
more likely that a defendant is coerced into pleading guilty, and yet it also increases the 
benefit offered in exchange for the guilty plea.”). 
91 Brereton & Casper, supra note 89, at 69. 
92 See id. at 45 (“It is this sentence differential (whether conceived of as a reward to 
guilty pleaders or as a punishment of those who waste the court’s time by ‘needless’ trials) 
which has traditionally been seen as the engine driving the plea-bargaining assembly 
line.”); see also Givelber, supra note 90, at 1382 (“The pragmatic justification for 
differential sentencing is simple and powerful: we want those charged with crimes to plead 
guilty, and differential sentencing provides an accused with a strong incentive to do just 
that.”). 
93  See Dervan, supra note 64, at 478–88. Along with increasing sentencing 
differentials, increasingly severe sentences have also increased the motivation for 
defendants to accept offers of leniency. See id. 
94 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 44, at fig.C. 
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II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S GREAT COMPROMISE  
REGARDING PLEA BARGAINING 
 
A.  The Court’s Early Rejection of Bargained Justice 
 
While plea-bargaining quickly grew in prominence within the trenches of the 
criminal justice system during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Supreme 
Court was much slower and more deliberate with its consideration of this new 
form of justice. In fact, for much of the time period during which plea-bargaining 
was rising from obscurity to prominence, the Supreme Court considered this 
bargained justice unconstitutional. 95  This, of course, did not prevent judges, 
prosecutors, and defendants from continuing to bargain in the shadows, a 
phenomenon which eventually became a significant reason for the Supreme 
Court’s sudden embrace of plea-bargaining in 1970.96 
The starting place for a historical analysis of the jurisprudence of plea-
bargaining is actually within the law of confession.97 This is because up until the 
twentieth century, guilty pleas were simply considered a form of confession that 
occurred inside a courtroom. 98  Professor Albert Alschuler addressed the link 
between the law of confession and guilty pleas in his 1979 work regarding the 
history of plea-bargaining.99 “[W]hile the legal phenomenon that we call a guilty 
plea has existed for more than eight centuries, the term ‘guilty plea’ came into 
common use only about one century ago. During the previous 700 years, what we 
call a guilty plea was simply called a ‘confession.’”100 
The most noteworthy pre-American common law case regarding confession is 
the 1783 English case of Rex v. Warickshall.101  In this case, the English court 
stated that confessions are improper and inadmissible where they are induced by 
“promises of favor.”102 The court continued, “[A] confession forced from the mind 
by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape   
                                                 
95 See infra text accompanying notes 124–197.  
96 See infra text accompanying notes 136–138, 221–236.  
97  See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 12. Professor Alschuler’s article contains a 
gripping account of the link between the law of confession and the law of guilty pleas. 
Although I will examine many of the same cases, this Article will focus more squarely on 
the issue of voluntariness as that term has evolved throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. See infra Part III (discerning the current meaning of the term “voluntary” 
through consideration of the history of plea bargaining case law as discussed in Part II.A.). 
98 See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 12. 
99 Id. at 12–13. 
100 Id.; see also Loftus E. Becker, Jr., Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court, 21 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 757, 776 (1988) (“Time and again, the Court analogized ‘involuntary’ 
guilty pleas to ‘compelled’ self-incrimination, to ‘coerced’ confessions and to the 
‘involuntary’ waiver of constitutional rights in general.”). 
101 (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 1 Leach 263. 
102 Id. at 234, 1 Leach at 263. 
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. . . that no credit ought to be given to it.”103 Thus, the concept that confessions and 
guilty pleas must be voluntary was born.104 
It was not until 1892 that the United States Supreme Court affirmed a guilty 
plea by a defendant in the matter of Hallinger v. Davis,105 wherein the Supreme 
Court clarified that the high standard for the admissibility of confessions utilized in 
England was equally applicable to a guilty plea in America. 106  Hallinger was 
indicted by a grand jury in New Jersey for murder.107 Shortly thereafter, he entered 
a guilty plea to the charges.108 The lower court was so uncomfortable with the idea 
of a defendant waving his or her right to trial, however, that it held the plea in 
abeyance and required the defendant to consult with counsel.109 Following the 
consultation, Hallinger again requested to plead guilty.110 After hearing testimony 
regarding the basis for the defendant’s plea, the court accepted the confession and 
sentenced Hallinger to death.111 In considering the case, the United States Supreme 
Court concluded that the defendant had “voluntarily” availed himself of the option 
to plead guilty and, while perhaps unwise, the decision did not violate any 
provisions of the Constitution.112 Hallinger was the first case in which the Supreme 
                                                 
103 Id. at 235, 1 Leach at 264.  
104 See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 12 (discussing Rex, 168 Eng. Rep. at 255, 1 Leach 
at 263–64). “It soon became clear that any confession ‘obtained by [a] direct or implied 
promise[], however slight’ could not be received in evidence. Even the offer of a glass of 
gin was a ‘promise of leniency’ capable of coercing a confession.” Id. (citations omitted); 
see also Baldwin & McConville, supra note 64, at 287–91 (discussing the use of plea 
bargaining in England). 
105 Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 324 (1892).  
106 See id. at 318–20. One of the earliest American cases discussing the need for guilty 
pleas to be voluntary was an 1804 Massachusetts Supreme Court case titled 
Commonwealth v. Battis, 1 Mass. 95, 95 (1804). Battis, an African American, was indicted 
in Massachusetts for the rape and murder of a thirteen-year-old Caucasian girl. Id. Upon 
being brought to court to answer the charges, Battis pleaded guilty. Id. Surprised by the 
defendant’s actions, the court remanded Battis to prison to reconsider his decision. Id. at 
95–96. Later that day, Battis was brought back before the judge and again pleaded guilty. 
Id. at 96. After thorough questioning, it was determined that there had been no “tampering 
with him, either by promises, persuasions, or hopes of pardon, if he would plead guilty.” 
Id. The court accepted the plea and Battis was sentenced to death. Id. The Battis case 
provides a glimpse into criminal practice in the nineteenth century and demonstrates that 
courts were reluctant to permit defendants to plead guilty. See id. Further, when such guilty 
pleas were permitted, they were only allowed where it was clear the defendant had been 
offered no promises and had endured no threats in deciding to confess his or her crime. See 
id. 
107 Hallinger, 146 U.S. at 315 (“Hallinger, the appellant, was on the 14th day of April, 
1891, indicted by the grand jury of Hudson County for the murder of one Mary 
Hallinger.”). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. (“[H]e was condemned to be hanged.”). 
112 Id. at 324. 
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Court concluded that pleas of guilty must be “voluntary,” a legal doctrine drawn 
directly from the English law of confession.113 
Though the Supreme Court failed to define the term “voluntary” with any 
precision in Hallinger, it was not necessary. At the time, one needed only examine 
case law regarding the definition of the term “voluntary” in the context of 
confessions, because, as described above, guilty pleas were simply in-court 
confessions in the eyes of the law.114 One such case was the 1897 case of Bram v. 
United States.115 Bram was accused of murdering a ship’s captain and others.116 
During his trial, the prosecution admitted a confession Bram made to police, 
though Bram protested that the confession had been extracted from him 
involuntarily.117 In ruling on the matter, the Supreme Court referred to the long 
history of case law establishing that one may not be compelled to testify against 
himself.118 
 
But a confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and voluntary: 
that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats of violence, nor 
obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the 
exertion of any improper influence. . . . [F]or the law cannot measure the 
force of the influence used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of 
the prisoner . . . .119 
 
According to the Court, the “true test of admissibility is that the confession is made 
freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort.”120 In the 
Bram case, the detective was found to have held out hope of leniency in return for 
Bram disclosing the identity of his accomplice. 121  The Court concluded that 
                                                 
113 See id.; see also Alschuler, supra note 65, at 10 (noting that this was also the first 
U.S. case to uphold a guilty plea). 
114 See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text. 
115 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
116 Id. at 537. 
117 Id. at 538–39. 
118 See id. at 545 (“There can be no doubt that long prior to our independence the 
doctrine that one accused of crime could not be compelled to testify against himself had 
reached its full development in common law. . . .”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
119 Bram, 168 U.S. at 542–43 (quoting 3 RUSSELL ON CRIMES 478 (6th ed.)). 
120 Id. at 548 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896)). Citing to 
Rex v. Thompson, (1783) 1 Leach 291, the Court stated: 
 
In Rex v. Thompson . . . a declaration to a suspected person that unless he gave 
more satisfactory account of his connection with a stolen bank note his 
interrogator would take him before a magistrate, was held equivalent to stating 
that it would be better to confess, and to have operated to lead the prisoner to 
believe that he would not be taken before a magistrate if he confessed.  
 
Id. at 551–52. 
121 Id. at 565. 
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Bram’s statements were involuntary, because they were induced by a promise of 
benefits.122 Based on the rulings in Hallinger and Bram, one can deduce that, had a 
plea bargaining case risen to the Supreme Court in the late 1800s, the Court would 
have clearly opposed the idea, just as so many state appellate courts did in the post-
Civil War period.123 
In 1878, the Supreme Court took up a series of cases termed the Whiskey 
Cases.124 The Court’s ruling in the Whiskey Cases dealt more with prosecutorial 
authority to offer deals than with the involuntary nature of an induced confession, 
but the cases offer confirmation of the Supreme Court’s antagonist view of 
bargained justice at a time when plea bargaining was just beginning its rise in the 
American criminal justice system.125 The Whiskey Cases involved prosecutions for 
violations of internal revenue laws regarding liquor sales.126 Perhaps in an effort to 
reward cooperation or clear a number of matters from his desk at one time, the 
prosecutor offered the defendants a deal in return for pleading guilty. 
 
[The parties] entered into an agreement by which it was, among other 
things, agreed that if the said defendants would testify on behalf of the 
plaintiffs frankly and truthfully . . . , and should plead guilty to one count 
in an indictment . . . , and should withdraw their pleas in a certain 
condemnation case then pending against them . . . , no new proceedings 
should be commenced against said defendants on account of transactions 
then past.127 
 
At the time, it was not uncommon for defendants to receive immunity from the 
governor in return for testifying against an accomplice. 128  The bargain here, 
however, went further in that the agreement did not emanate from the governor but 
directly from the prosecutor. 129  Further, the agreement did not merely offer 
immunity in return for cooperation, but also required the defendants to plead guilty 
to a single charge of the indictment in return for the other two charges being 
dropped.130 Regarding this effort by the prosecution to induce the defendants to 
                                                 
122 Id. 
123  See supra notes 64–70 and accompanying text (discussing the rise of plea 
bargaining in the post-Civil War period). 
124 See Whisky Cases, 99 U.S. 594 (1878). 
125 See supra notes 121–128 and accompanying text; see also Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 
318, 333 (1882) (holding that a guilty plea must be voluntary, and finding that where a 
defendant pleaded guilty for fear of mob violence, the plea was not voluntary). 
126 See Whisky Cases, 99 U.S. at 594–95. 
127 Id. 
128 See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 15 (“[W]hen defendants were induced to testify 
against their accomplices, Anglo-American courts refused to convict them on the basis of 
their bargained confessions. The courts instead insisted that these defendants be given what 
modern lawyers would call transactional immunity.”). 
129 See Whisky Cases, 99 U.S. at 598. 
130 See id. 
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plead guilty, the Supreme Court stated, “[T]he district attorney had no authority to 
make the agreement alleged in the plea in bar,” and, as such, the bargain was 
unenforceable. 131  While the Whiskey Cases decision did not refer to the 
defendants’ guilty pleas as “involuntary,” the Court’s concern over this perception 
likely influenced its decision to prohibit such deal making. 
As the Rex, Hallinger, Bram and Whiskey cases demonstrate, plea-bargaining 
was impermissible in the eyes of the Supreme Court during the late nineteenth 
century.132 
However, while the Supreme Court and various state courts were succinctly 
rejecting attempts by prosecutors to offer inducements to defendants in return for 
guilty pleas, plea-bargaining continued to be utilized in the trenches.133 It is not 
surprising that more cases did not reach the Supreme Court to challenge this 
growing phenomenon because defendants who were satisfied with their bargain 
had no reason to appeal their convictions.134 Gradually, however, appellate cases 
began appearing in the federal system and, by the early twentieth century, the 
Court was once again addressing this ever-growing phenomenon. 
In 1927, the Supreme Court was tasked with addressing the constitutionality 
of prosecutors offering incentives for defendants to plead guilty in the case of 
Kercheval v. United States.135 Kercheval pleaded guilty to a charge of using the 
mail to defraud and was sentenced to three years in prison.136 According to the 
defendant, he was induced to plead guilty because the prosecutor promised to 
                                                 
131 Id. at 606. 
132 One legal annotation from the period summarized the law as follows: 
 
We would conclude, from an examination of all the cases upon the subject, that 
where there is an inducement of any kind held out to the prisoner, by reason of 
which he enters the plea of guilty, it will . . . better comport with a sound 
judicial discretion to allow the plea to be withdrawn . . . , and especially so when 
counsel and friends represent to the accused that it has been the custom and 
practice of the court to assess a punishment less than the maximum upon such a 
plea . . . . 
 
Alschuler, supra note 65, at 24 (quoting Hopkins, Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty, 11 CRIM. 
L. MAG. 479, 484 (1889)). 
133 See supra notes 97–135 and accompanying text. 
134 In 1968, the American Bar Association released a report that included discussion 
of the shadowy nature of plea bargaining up to that point in the American criminal system. 
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 77, at vii (“The subject 
of this report—pleas of guilty, including the related matter of plea negotiations—was given 
a high priority by the Special Committee. One of the purposes of the Project was to turn a 
spotlight on what have been called ‘low visibility’ areas in the criminal process, those not 
likely to be scrutinized by the appellate courts and to be discussed in widely-printed 
opinions. This is such an area, and its importance is indicated by the fact that the great 
majority of all convictions are the result of pleas of guilty.”). 
135 Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 221 (1927). 
136 Id. 
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recommend a sentence of three months in jail.137 After being sentenced to three 
years in prison, Kercheval filed a petition seeking to enforce the prosecutor’s 
promise.138 The court declined, but did allow him to withdraw his guilty plea.139 At 
trial, however, the court permitted the prosecution to introduce the prior guilty plea 
as evidence against the defendant. 140  As might be expected, Kercheval was 
convicted and once again sentenced to three years in prison.141 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Justices concluded that Kercheval’s 
withdrawn guilty plea was inadmissible.142 More importantly, however, the Court 
commented on the plea bargain between the government and the defendant.143 
 
A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or 
an extrajudicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a 
jury it is conclusive. More is not required; the court has nothing to do but 
give judgment and sentence. Out of just consideration for persons 
accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be 
accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full 
understanding of the consequences. . . . But, on timely application, the 
court will vacate a plea of guilty shown to have been unfairly obtained or 
given through ignorance, fear or inadvertence.144 
 
Rather than positing that prosecutors are afforded more leeway to bargain for 
guilty pleas than might be permitted in the context of confessions to police 
officers, the Court indicated that even greater care should be taken to ensure guilty 
pleas are voluntary.145 Once again, the Court reiterated the long-standing principle 
that guilty pleas must be voluntary and may not be induced by “ignorance, fear or 
inadvertence.”146 
As the criminal dockets swelled during the early twentieth century and 
prosecutors began to offer plea bargains in greater numbers, the Supreme Court 
remained on the sidelines. It was not until 1941 that the Court again addressed the 
issue of bargained justice, this time in its most direct manner yet.147 In 1936, Jack 
Walker pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with armed robbery of a 
                                                 
137  Id. During the negotiations, the prosecutor also asserted that the court would 
impose the recommended sentence. Id. 
138 See id. 
139 Id. (“After hearing evidence on the issue, the court declined so to change the 
sentence, but on petitioner’s motion, set aside the judgment and allowed him to withdraw 
his plea of guilty and to plead not guilty.”). 
140 Id. at 221–22. 
141 Id. at 222. 
142 See id. at 223, 225. 
143 See id. at 223–24. 
144 Id. 
145 See id. 
146 Id. 
147 See Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941). 
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national bank.148 After being sentenced to twelve years in prison, Walker filed a 
writ of habeas corpus.149 In his writ, he alleged that he had been induced to plead 
guilty by promises of leniency and threats of harsher sanctions for a failure to 
cooperate.150 According to the Court: 
 
[The District Attorney] told him to plead guilty, warning him that he 
would be sentenced to twice as great a term if he did not so plead . . . . In 
view of the District Attorney’s warning, and in fear of a heavy prison 
term, he told the District Attorney he would plead guilty.151 
 
While these arrangements seem common by today’s standards, the Supreme Court 
found the prosecutor’s actions to be improper in 1941.152 The Court concluded that 
prosecutor’s threats had resulted in Walker involuntarily pleading guilty, a clear 
violation of the standard established in earlier precedent regarding voluntariness, 
confession, and pleas of guilt.153 The Court remarked: 
 
[Walker] was deceived and coerced into pleading guilty when his real 
desire was to plead not guilty or at least to be advised by counsel as to 
his course. If he did not voluntarily waive his right to counsel, or if he 
was deceived or coerced by the prosecutor into entering a guilty plea, he 
was deprived of a constitutional right.154 
 
As a result, the Supreme Court remanded the case for a hearing regarding Walker’s 
allegations.155 While the language of Walker should have given prosecutors pause 
before continuing to offer defendants plea bargains, the rising tide of plea-
bargaining and the courts’ growing reliance on such swift justice was likely 
already unstoppable. 
A year later, the Supreme Court again addressed the standards applicable to 
guilty pleas. In Waley v. Johnston,156 the Supreme Court examined allegations that 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents had physically threatened a defendant 
and had threatened to “publish false statements and manufacture false evidence 
that the kidnaped person had been injured, and by such publications and false 
evidence to incite the public and to cause the State of Washington to hang the 
petitioner . . . .”157 According to Waley, the government’s threats that he would be 
                                                 
148 Id. at 279. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 280–81. 
151 Id. at 280. 
152 See id. at 286–87. 
153 See id. at 286; see also Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 324 (1892) (requiring 
that the defendant voluntarily avail himself of the option to plead guilty). 
154 Walker, 312 U.S. at 286. 
155 Id. at 287. 
156 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942). 
157 Id. at 102. 
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thrown out a window and beaten were unpersuasive.158 However, the threats that 
false evidence would be offered to increase his punishment to death were 
compelling and induced him to plead guilty as demanded.159 
In ordering the lower court to conduct a hearing regarding Waley’s writ of 
habeas corpus, the Supreme Court concluded that while the allegations may “tax 
credulity,” they certainly called for further inquiry.160 In describing the applicable 
considerations during the lower court hearing, the Supreme Court reiterated the 
requirement that guilty pleas be entered voluntarily.161 According to the Court, 
“[i]f the allegations are found to be true, petitioner’s constitutional rights were 
infringed. For a conviction on a plea of guilty coerced by a federal law 
enforcement officer is no more consistent with due process than a conviction 
supported by a coerced confession.”162 As late as 1940, therefore, the voluntariness 
standard as applied uniformly to guilty pleas and confessions remained the same 
and coercive tactics and incentives rendered any such admissions 
unconstitutional.163 
In 1958, the issue of plea bargaining again reached the Supreme Court, but, 
on this occasion, the case was never decided for fear the result would throw the 
entire American criminal justice system into chaos.164 The case for consideration 
was that of Paul Shelton, who, despite consistently maintaining his innocence, 
pleaded guilty to one count of interstate transportation of stolen vehicles after 
being promised leniency.165 The prosecution had induced Shelton to confess his 
guilt by promising a sentence of no more than one year and dismissal of all other 
pending charges.166 Though these promises sound similar to those made to Lea 
                                                 
158  See id. (“The petitioner stated generally that threats of . . . agents to throw 
petitioner out of a window and ‘beat [him] up’ ‘didn’t bother [him].’”). 
159 Id. (“But [the petition] specifically alleged that petitioner’s plea of guilty had been 
induced by the threats of a named [FBI] agent to publish false statements and manufacture 
false evidence that the kidnaped person had been injured . . . .”). 
160 See id. at 104. 
161 See id. 
162 Id. 
163 See id. 
164 See Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1957), judgment set aside, 246 
F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d per curiam on confession of error, 356 U.S. 26 
(1958). 
165 Shelton, 242 F.2d at 102.  
166 Id. at 102 & n.1. According to the opinion, Shelton was induced to plead guilty 
based on the following promises: 
 
(1) government counsel’s promise to arrange for dismissal of all other federal 
charges, (2) government’s counsel’s ‘guarantee’ of a sentence of not more than 
one year in the instant case, (3) government’s counsel’s threat that it would take 
defendant longer to get tried on the other pending charges than it would take 
him to serve a one year sentence, and (4) defendant’s confused, anxious, 
desperate, and incompetent state of mind resulting from prolonged confinement 
in county jails while awaiting trial as aforesaid.  
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Fastow in 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded 
that Shelton’s plea must be vacated because the prosecutor’s promises of leniency 
likely meant the plea was not entered “voluntarily.”167 
 
There is no doubt, indeed it is practically conceded, that the appellant 
pleaded guilty in reliance on the promise of the Assistant United States 
Attorney that he would receive a sentence of only one year. The court, 
before accepting the plea, did not ascertain that it was in truth and in fact 
a voluntary plea not induced by such promise. It necessarily follows that 
the judgment of conviction must be set aside and the plea of guilty 
vacated.168 
 
In the opinion of the judges on the Fifth Circuit in 1957: “Justice and liberty are 
not the subjects of bargaining and barter.”169 
Interestingly, the panel decision from the Fifth Circuit was later overturned en 
banc, and the case proceeded to the Supreme Court.170 The Court never addressed 
the challenge to plea-bargaining, however, because the government filed an 
admission that the guilty plea may have been improperly obtained and the case was 
remanded to the District Court without further discussion. 171  According to 
Professor Albert Alschuler, evidence indicates that the government likely 
confessed its error for fear that the Supreme Court would finally make a direct 
ruling that all manner of plea bargaining was wholly unconstitutional.172 
By 1963, when the Supreme Court ruled in the Lynumn case that her 
confession was involuntarily coerced due to threats regarding her children and her 
potential prison sentence, one other significant plea bargaining case had come 
before the Court.173 In 1962, the court considered whether it was appropriate for a 
                                                 
 
Id. 
167 See id. at 113 (“If a plea of guilty is made upon any understanding or agreement as 
to the punishment to be recommended, it is essential, we think, that, before accepting such 
plea, the district court should make certain that the plea is in fact made voluntarily.”). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 573 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc). 
171 See Shelton v. United States, 356 U.S. 26, 26 (1958) (“The motion for leave to 
proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. Upon 
consideration of the entire record and confession of error by the Solicitor General that the 
plea of guilty may have been improperly obtained, the judgment of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court 
for further proceedings.”). 
172 Alschuler, supra note 65, at 37 (“In 1958, the Solicitor General (or perhaps some 
other official in the Justice Department) may have assessed the probable votes of individual 
Supreme Court Justices, may have sensed a substantial likelihood that the Court would 
hold the practice of plea bargaining unlawful, and may have sought to foreclose this ruling 
through a confession of error on narrow and disingenuous grounds.”). 
173 See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962). 
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United States Attorney to promise a defendant that in return for pleading guilty his 
sentence would be no more than twenty years in prison.174 In the alternative, the 
prosecutor stated that if the defendant did not cooperate, “certain unsettled matters 
concerning two other robberies would be added to the petitioner’s difficulties.”175 
The Supreme Court remanded the Machibroda case for further fact finding, but 
concluded that if the allegations were true, the petitioner was “clearly entitled to 
relief.”176 
 
There can be no doubt that, if the allegations contained in the petitioner’s 
motion and affidavit are true, he is entitled to have his sentence vacated. 
A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the 
character of a voluntary act, is void. . . . Like a verdict of a jury [a plea 
of guilty] is conclusive. . . . Out of just consideration for persons accused 
of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted 
unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding 
of the consequences.177 
 
With such strong language regarding the requirement that plea bargains be 
voluntary and the historical context that guilty pleas and confessions were treated 
in the same manner, it is little surprise that a year later the Supreme Court struck 
down Beatrice Lynumn’s confession as a statement made after threats of 
punishment and promises of leniency.178 
In 1968, the Supreme Court once again struck a blow to plea-bargaining, 
though this did not stop the acceleration of its growth. In United States v. 
Jackson,179 the Court examined a federal statute that differentiated between the 
punishment available to those who pleaded guilty and those who put the 
government to its burden.180 The law, 18 U.S.C. section 1201(a), reads as follows: 
 
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate . . . commerce, any person 
who had been unlawfully . . . kidnaped and held for ransom . . . or 
otherwise . . . shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnapped person has 
not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so 
recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if 
the death penalty is not imposed.181 
 
As illustrated in the statute’s text above, the death penalty was only available 
where a jury convicted the defendant and recommended capital punishment. 
                                                 
174 Id. at 489–90. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 493, 496. 
177 Id. at 493 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
178 See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 537–38 (1963). 
179 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). 
180 Id. at 570–72.  
181 Id. at 570–71. 
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Where the defendant pleaded guilty, however, the judge was limited to imposing a 
sentence of life in prison.182 In October 1966, a federal grand jury in Connecticut 
charged Charles Jackson and two others with a kidnapping that resulted in an 
injury to the victim.183 The District Court, however, struck the indictment because 
it found that the statute unconstitutionally made the “risk of death” the “price for 
asserting the right to jury trial.”184 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, a majority of the Justices agreed that the 
statute imposed an “impermissible burden upon the exercise of a constitutional 
right.”185 
 
It is no answer . . . that federal trial judges may be relied upon to reject 
coerced pleas of guilty and involuntary waivers of jury trials. For the evil 
in the federal statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and 
jury waivers but simply that it needlessly encourages them. A procedure 
need not be inherently coercive in order that it be held to impose an 
impermissible burden upon the assertion of a constitutional right. Thus 
the fact that the [statute] tends to discourage defendants from insisting 
upon their innocence and demanding trial by jury hardly implies that 
every defendant who enters a guilty plea to a charge under the [statute] 
does so involuntarily. The power to reject coerced guilty pleas and 
involuntary jury waivers might alleviate, but it cannot totally eliminate, 
the constitutional infirmity in the capital punishment provision of the 
[statute].186 
 
This is perhaps one of the most significant statements ever made about plea-
bargaining by the Supreme Court. According to the Court, and consistent with 
earlier precedent, voluntary guilty pleas are permissible.187 In fact, the Court states 
that the power of the lower court’s to accept a guilty plea is traditional and 
“necessary for the . . . practical . . . administration of the criminal law.”188 The 
Court offers as an example of a voluntary plea motivated by constitutional 
considerations the case where an individual pleads guilty to “spare themselves and 
their families the spectacle and expense of protracted courtroom proceedings.”189 
The Court implies, however, that guilty pleas induced by coercive threats of 
punishment or offers of leniency are unconstitutional.190 With regard to the federal 
kidnapping statute, the threat of death only for those who refuse to confess their 
                                                 
182 See id.  
183 Id. at 571 & n.1.  
184 Id. at 571. 
185  Id. at 572. The Court, however, disagreed that the statute as a whole was 
unconstitutional and, instead, severed the provision from the remainder of the statute. Id. 
186 Id. at 583. 
187 Id. at 584–85. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 584. 
190 See id. at 583. 
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guilt is an example of a coercive incentive that makes any resulting guilty plea 
invalid.191 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice White argued that the kidnapping statute 
should not be held unconstitutional.192 Relying on the majority’s conclusion that 
“not every plea of guilty or waiver of the jury trial would be influenced by the 
power of the jury to impose the death penalty,” Justice White stated that trial 
courts need only carefully examine a defendant’s guilty plea.193 In so doing, the 
lower court can make an individual determination “to make sure that they have 
been neither coerced nor encouraged by the death penalty power in the jury.”194 
For the majority, however, there was no legitimate justification for the imposition 
of death upon only those who seek a trial and, therefore, while Justice White’s 
approach may be appropriate in most cases, it was not sufficient to correct the 
unconstitutional construction of this particular statute.195 
By 1968, the Supreme Court had struck down every guilty plea induced by 
threats of punishment or promises of leniency that had arrived on its docket.196 The 
necessity of the plea bargaining machine, however, had never been greater. As the 
implementation of the procedural rights given to defendants during the Due 
Process Revolution slowed trial proceedings and criminal dockets continued to 
swell,197 prosecutors had no choice but to continue to utilize a constitutionally 
questionable system. Finally, in 1970, the Supreme Court directly addressed the 
issue of plea-bargaining’s constitutionality, but the result was stunning in that it 
was inconsistent with over a century of precedent and the Court’s prior animosity 
towards bargained justice. 
 
                                                 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 592 (White, J., dissenting). 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 See id. at 583. Following Jackson, the Supreme Court ruled in the 1969 case of 
McCarthy v. United States that federal courts must personally address the defendant to 
satisfy the requirements of Rule 11. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463–64 
(1969). Interestingly, in McCarthy, one sees that even in the late 1960s, prosecutors were 
weary of creating plea agreements that contained direct promises of leniency. See id. at 
461–62. In McCarthy, the defendant agreed to plead guilty to one charge of tax evasion. Id. 
at 461. After the guilty plea was accepted, the prosecutor moved to dismiss two other 
pending tax charges. Id. at 461. In so doing, the prosecutor made clear to the court that the 
dismissal was primarily motivated by the defendant’s agreement to pay all taxes, penalties, 
and interest with regard to any remaining tax burden. See id. at 461–62. In fact, the 
prosecutor went on to insist that the judge ask the defendant if he had been induced by any 
threats or promises. Id. at 461. The defendant stated that he had not and, therefore, the 
lower court concluded the plea was voluntary. See id.; see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395 
U.S. 238, 242–43 (1969) (ruling that Rule 11 requirements also apply to state court 
proceedings and stating that “[i]gnorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducement, 
subtle or blatant threats might be a perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality”). 
196 See supra notes 115–199 and accompanying text. 
197 See infra notes 230–233 and accompanying text.  
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B.  The Supreme Court’s Great Compromise of 1970 
 
In 1970, a case came before the Supreme Court that would help usher in the 
final stages of plea-bargaining’s triumph. In 1959, Robert Brady was charged with 
kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), the same criminal statute that had 
been at issue in the Jackson case in 1968.198 As previously discussed, the statute 
allowed for the death penalty only when recommended by a jury.199 As a result, a 
defendant who pleaded guilty and avoided a jury trial could successfully avoid the 
death penalty in favor of the alternative maximum sentence of life in prison.200 The 
victim in the Brady case had not been liberated unharmed and, therefore, Brady 
was subject to the death penalty provision if recommended by a jury.201 At first, 
Brady pleaded not guilty and intended to proceed to trial.202 Brady later learned 
that his co-defendant had agreed to plead guilty and intended to testify against him 
at trial.203 As such, Brady changed his plea to guilty and was sentenced to fifty 
years in prison.204 Brady later sought relief from the Supreme Court, claiming that 
his plea was involuntary because the statute coerced him into avoiding a jury trial 
to ensure that he would not be sentenced to death.205 In examining Brady’s claim, 
the lower court concluded, “no representations [were] made with respect to a 
reduced sentence or clemency.” 206  Thus, the lower court held the guilty plea 
voluntary.207 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that guilty pleas must be 
voluntary and intelligent, a determination that must be conducted based on the 
facts of the case. 208  The first question examined by the Court, therefore, was 
whether Brady’s plea was involuntary because he faced a more severe sentence if 
found guilty after trial.209 The Court concluded that just because the enhanced 
penalty led to Brady’s decision, it does not follow that the plea was necessarily 
involuntary.210 Rather, Brady’s decision was similar to one made by a defendant 
who pleads guilty in the face of overwhelming evidence rather than subjecting his 
                                                 
198 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 743 (1970). 
199 See id. 
200 See id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 743–44. 
205 Id. at 744. 
206 Id. at 745. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. at 748. 
209 Id. at 749. 
210 Id. at 749–50 (“But even if we assume that Brady would not have pleaded guilty 
except for the death penalty provision of § 1201(a), this assumption merely identifies the 
penalty provision as a “but for” cause of his plea. That the statute caused the plea in this 
sense does not necessarily prove that the plea was coerced and invalid as an involuntary 
act.”). 
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or her family to the expense of trial.211 The Court continued, however, with a 
caveat regarding coercive tactics by the prosecution. 
 
Of course, the agents of the State may not produce a plea by actual or 
threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of 
the defendant. But nothing of the sort is claimed in this case; nor is there 
evidence that Brady was so gripped by fear of the death penalty or hope 
of leniency that he did not or could not, with the help of counsel, 
rationally weigh the advantages of going to trial against the advantages 
of pleading guilty.212 
 
According to the Court, where the defendant pleads guilty in return for the 
“certainty or probability of a lesser penalty [as contained in the statute] rather than 
face the wider range of possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a 
higher penalty authorized by law for the crime charged,” the plea is voluntary and 
constitutionally sound. 213  The Court concluded that a guilty plea to avoid a 
possible death penalty under the applicable statute is valid.214 
Based on its statements that a defendant may plead guilty in return for the 
promise or possibility of a reduced sentence, the Supreme Court appears to have 
adopted language crafted by Judge Tuttle of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit to describe the applicable test for “voluntariness” moving 
forward.215 
 
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, 
including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, 
prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or 
promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation 
(including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises 
                                                 
211 Id. at 750 (“The State to some degree encourages pleas of guilty at every important 
step in the criminal process. For some people, their breach of a State’s law is alone 
sufficient reason for surrendering themselves and accepting punishment. For others, 
apprehension and charge, both threatening acts by the Government, jar them into admitting 
their guilt. In still other cases, the post-indictment accumulation of evidence may convince 
the defendant and his counsel that a trial is not worth the agony and expense to the 
defendant and his family. All these pleas of guilty are valid in spite of the State’s 
responsibility for some of the factors motivating the pleas . . . .”). 
212 Id. at 750. 
213 Id. at 751. 
214 Id. at 755. 
215 Id. at 755. The Court attempts to explain the apparent inconsistency between its 
decision in Brady and the prior precedent of Bram. According to the Court, the decision in 
Bram is distinguishable because there was no counsel present, the threats and promises 
were made face-to-face, and there was a hazard of an impulsive and improvident response 
to a seeming but unreal advantage. Id. at 754–55. 
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that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the 
prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).216  
 
By the end of 1970, therefore, confession law and the law of guilty pleas had 
diverged significantly. No longer was any promise of leniency thought to corrupt a 
guilty plea as the Court had ruled throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Though the plea must still be “voluntary,” the term had shifted to mean 
merely that the plea could not be induced “by actual or threatened physical harm or 
by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant.”217 A dramatic shift had 
occurred in the law, and, although there was still an upper limit beyond which 
inducements to plead guilty could not venture, that limit was much higher than it 
had been just a few short years before.218 Plea-bargaining, it seemed, had finally 
established itself as an unseverable part of the American criminal justice system. 
It is clear that the Supreme Court radically departed from its previous 
decisions to craft its decision in Brady, but it is unclear why the Court felt it 
necessary to make such a significant departure from past precedent. The answer, it 
appears, has much to do with plea-bargaining’s rise to dominance by 1970 and the 
realities of an overburdened criminal justice system. 
Despite the hostility expressed towards bargained justice by the Supreme 
Court prior to the Brady decision in 1970, the plea-bargaining machine continued 
to evolve and to increase in influence. Early records indicate that in the first half of 
the nineteenth century only 10 to 15 percent of cases resulted in a guilty plea.219 
While plea-bargaining may have occurred in certain of these cases, it is likely 
many were merely cases in which the defendant did not wish to endure trial when 
the evidence appeared overwhelming, such as occurred in the Hallinger case in 
1892.220 Shortly thereafter, however, the rate of convictions by guilty plea began 
an upward climb.221 By 1908, 50 percent of federal criminal cases resulted in pleas 
                                                 
216 Id. at 755. Interestingly, this test appears to be plucked from the en banc decision 
in Shelton v. United States, the case the solicitor general removed from the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction by offering a confession of error for fear the Supreme Court as 
composed in 1958 would strike plea bargaining as unconstitutional in its entirety. Shelton 
v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d per curiam on 
confession of error, 356 U.S. 26 (1958). 
217  See Brady, 397 U.S. at 750–51; see also Becker, supra note 100, at 759 
(“Although the Court agreed that guilty pleas were invalid if not ‘voluntary,’ its treatment 
of voluntariness cut that concept loose from its moorings in the law.”). 
218 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 757–58; see also Becker, supra note 100, at 759 (“In Brady 
v. United States and its companion cases, however, the Court denied the relevance not 
merely of some but all prior doctrine.”). 
219 See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 10 (noting that Boston Police Court records from 
1824 indicated that only 11 percent of defendants entered pleas of guilty); id. at 18 (noting 
that in 1839, 15% of all defendants in Manhattan and Brooklyn pleaded guilty). 
220 Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314 (1892). 
221 See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 27 (“In the federal courts, the statistics date from 
1908, when only about 50% of all convictions were by plea of guilty. This percentage 
remained fairly constant until 1916, when it increased to 72%.”). 
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of guilty, and by 1916 this number had increased to 72 percent.222 By 1960, the 
decade just prior to the Brady decision, approximately 90 percent of cases in the 
American criminal justice system were resolved through a guilty plea.223 Perhaps 
the increase in guilty pleas reflected a growing desire by defendants to confess 
their sins, but, more likely, it is a reflection of the growing dominance of plea-
bargaining throughout this period. 
Given that 90 percent of all convictions by 1970 were the result of a guilty 
plea, most acquired in return for some benefit from the prosecution, the Supreme 
Court was tasked with a very difficult decision in Brady. If the Court continued 
with the century-old line of cases regarding confession, plea-bargaining would 
certainly have been found unconstitutional. The results of such a ruling, however, 
would be to destroy the criminal justice system, a system that was already 
struggling to dispose of its ever-growing docket even with 90 percent of cases 
ending without a trial. 224  The shadowy rise of plea-bargaining during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries helped solidify its role in the criminal 
justice system, because, by the time the Supreme Court came to address the issue 
specifically, all court systems in the United States relied on bargained justice to 
survive.225 
                                                 
222 Id.  
223 Borteck, supra note 79, at 1439 n.43 (2004) (citing Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy 
Where It Matters: Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 
1 (2002) (noting that since the 1960s the plea bargaining rate has been around 90 percent)); 
see also ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 1–2 (“The 
plea of guilty is probably the most frequent method of conviction in all jurisdictions; in 
some localities as many as 95 per cent of the criminal cases are disposed in of this way.”). 
Today, pleas of guilty account for over 95 percent of all federal cases. See U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 44. 
224 See F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting 
the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. 
PUB. L. 189, 192 (2002) (noting that if plea-bargaining were not available, “the legal 
system would crumble under the weight of the cases requiring juries and judges”); Thomas 
R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due Process in Determining Guilt, 32 
STAN. L. REV. 887, 895 n.40 (1980) (citing John Kaplan, American Merchandising and the 
Guilty Plea: Replacing the Bazaar with the Department Store, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215, 220 
(1977)) (stating that the costs of administering the criminal justice system in the 1970s 
would have doubled if plea-bargaining had been reduced even from 90 percent to 80 
percent of all cases). 
225 The Court also likely realized that even if it explicitly ruled that plea-bargaining 
was unconstitutional, the reluctance of prosecutors, defendants, and courts to observe the 
Court’s earlier rejection of bargained justice meant that plea-bargaining would simply slip 
back into the shadows as an unofficial means of dealing with the pressures of the system. 
See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (“[A] rigid constitutional rule that 
would prohibit a prosecutor from acting forthrightly in his dealings with the defense could 
only invite unhealthy subterfuge that would drive the practice of plea bargaining back into 
the shadows from which it has so recently emerged.”). 
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As if the criminal justice system were not already bogged down with growing 
caseloads, in part due to overcriminalization, the Supreme Court had just finished 
handing defendants a number of significant victories during the due process 
revolution of the 1960s 226  For instance, the Supreme Court imposed the 
“exclusionary rule” for violations of the Fourth Amendment, granted the right to 
counsel, and imposed the obligation that suspects be informed of their rights prior 
to being interrogated.227 The result was not only to increase the complexity of 
criminal prosecutions, but also to increase the length of trials. In many 
jurisdictions, the length of trial almost doubled from the early 1960s to the late 
1960s.228 According to one commentator, “A major effect of the ‘due process 
revolution’ was to augment the pressures for plea negotiation. For one thing, the 
Supreme Court’s decisions contributed to the growing backlog of criminal cases. . . 
. In addition, the Court’s decisions probably contributed to the increased length of 
the criminal trial.”229 
The Supreme Court considered the necessity of plea-bargaining as a tool to 
promote judicial economy in reaching its decision in Brady.230 The Court noted 
that 90 to 95 percent of all convictions are the result of a guilty plea and that “with 
the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for 
those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant’s guilt.”231 The 
Court also went on to cite an American Bar Association report on plea-bargaining 
issued in 1968.232 The report stated, “It may be noted . . . that a high proportion of 
plea of guilty and nolo contendere does benefit the system. Such pleas tend to limit 
                                                 
226  See generally Dripps, supra note 76, at 1156–61 (discussing the relationship 
between broadening legal rules and plea-bargaining); Stuntz, supra note 76, at 519–20 
(2001) (discussing the influence of broader laws on the rate of plea-bargaining). 
227 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (self-incrimination); Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) 
(exclusionary rule). 
228 See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 38 (“In the District of Columbia, the length of the 
average felony trial grew from 1.9 days in 1950 to 2.8 days in 1965, and in Los Angeles the 
length of the average felony jury trial increased from 3.5 days in 1964 to 7.2 days in 
1968.”). 
229 Id. 
230 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); see also Hessick and Saujani, 
supra note 224, at 192 (noting that “efficiency is the overriding cause for entering plea 
negotiations in general”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 
12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 308–22 (1983). 
231 Brady, 397 U.S. at 752 & n.10; see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 
260 (1971) (“The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and 
the accused, sometimes loosely called ‘plea bargaining,’ is an essential component of the 
administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged.”). 
232 Brady, 397 U.S. at 752 n.9 (citing ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 37–52); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 
(1978) (citing ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE , supra note 77, at 60–
69 in support of its conclusion that a recommendation of leniency is permitted as part of a 
plea bargain). 
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the trial process to deciding real disputes and, consequently, to reduce the need for 
funds and personnel.”233 
Faced with a daunting decision, the Supreme Court chose to make a great 
compromise. Defendants had already been afforded significant additional rights 
during the 1960’s due process revolution. Now the Court would permit defendants, 
armed with their new rights, the ability to bargain for a more lenient sentence when 
the government had significant evidence against them. At the same time, plea-
bargaining would provide courts with a mechanism for keeping up with their 
growing case loads and allow them to continue dispensing justice in a timely 
manner. 
 
III.  PLEA BARGAINING’S INNOCENCE PROBLEM 
 
A.  The Coercive Consequences of the Great Compromise 
 
In the same year the Supreme Court decided Brady, it also handed down 
another plea-bargaining decision that helped to solidify bargained justice as a 
major facet of the American criminal justice system. In North Carolina v. 
Alford,234 the Court stated that a defendant could plead guilty in return for some 
benefit, such as a reduced sentence, while continuing to maintain his or her 
innocence.235 The Court inserted a caveat, however, requiring the “record before 
the judge contain[] strong evidence of actual guilt” to ensure the rights of the 
innocent are protected and guilty pleas are the result of “free and intelligent 
choice.”236 
In 1977, Kerry Max Cook was arrested for the rape and murder of a woman in 
Tyler, Texas.237 Though Cook was convicted by a jury and sentenced to death a 
year later, he continued to profess his innocence.238 During his time on death row, 
Cook was abused, raped, and attempted to commit suicide twice.239 After one 
suicide attempt, prison officials found a note that stated, “I really was an innocent 
man.”240 His initial conviction was eventually overturned and a second trial in 
                                                 
233 See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 2. 
234 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
235 Id. at 37; see also Andrew D. Leipond, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to 
Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1156 (2005) (“An Alford plea, where 
the defendant pleads guilty but simultaneously denies having committed the crime, clearly 
puts the court on notice that this guilty plea is problematic . . . .”). 
236 Alford, 400 U.S. at 37, 38 n.10; Leipond, supra note 235. Currently, the federal 
system, the District of Columbia, and forty-seven states permit Alford pleas. See Stephanos 
Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case 
of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1372 n.52 (2003). 
237  The Plea, FRONTLINE (June 17, 2004), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
pages/frontline/shows/plea/four/cook.html. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
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1992 resulted in a hung jury.241 The government retried Cook again, and the death 
penalty was imposed by a jury a second time.242 In 1996, Cook’s conviction was 
again overturned, this time due to police and prosecutorial misconduct dating back 
to the initial investigation and trial of Cook in 1978.243 Despite the numerous 
setbacks, the government moved forward to retry Cook a fourth time.244 Due to the 
prior misconduct, however, the prosecutor in the case would no longer be able to 
use the testimony of a central witness in the case.245 As the trial for Cook’s life 
approached, the prosecution conceded that the case was looking increasingly 
weak.246 
Having discussed the evolution of the plea-bargaining machine it will come as 
no surprise that the prosecutor responded to the significant likelihood of losing a 
trial by offering Cook a plea deal.247 In return for pleading guilty, Cook would 
receive a sentence of time served and walk out of prison. 248  Cook refused, 
however, continuing to profess his innocence.249 
 
Kerry [Max Cook] looked [his attorney] in the eye and said, “I want to 
be free, I want this behind me, but I will go back to death row, I will let 
them strap me to the gurney and put the poison in my veins before I lie, 
before I plead guilty.250 
 
In response, the prosecutor offered Cook the same deal in return for an Alford 
plea. 251  Cook could now plead guilty, while, at the same time, continuing to 
maintain his innocence.252 Cook took the plea agreement and, twenty-two years 
after being placed in prison, walked free. 253  Two months later, a DNA test 
conclusively demonstrated that Cook was not a match to forensic evidence 
                                                 
241 Id. 
242 Id. 
243  Id. (The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals “wrote that the investigation was 
intentionally misleading, the testimony of the key witness, Robert Hoehn, was prejudicial, 
and the first conviction was obtained through fraud and in violation of the law.”). 
244 Id. 
245 Id. (“The irony was that the testimony of the witness, Robert Hoehn, who had died 
in the meantime, was the example cited by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals as 
prejudicial and contradictory.”). 
246 See id. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
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obtained at the scene of the crime in 1977.254 Though he had been induced to plead 
guilty, Cook was, in fact, innocent.255 
Today, over 95 percent of defendants in the criminal justice system plead 
guilty and, in most cases, such confessions are prompted by offers of leniency or 
other benefits from the prosecution.256 It is unclear how many of these defendants 
are innocent, but it is clear that plea-bargaining has an innocence problem.257 At 
                                                 
254 Id. 
255 Id. (“So, you know, was it worth it? Sometimes when I’m holding my son I can 
say yes. Sometimes, when I’m by myself, I say no. They won.”). Cook is certainly not the 
only innocent defendant coerced into pleading guilty by overpowering plea offers. A 1999 
Los Angeles Times article describing newly discovered evidence in a police corruption 
case discussed the case of two defendants who may have been framed by police. See 
Samuel H. Pillsbury, Even the Innocent Can be Coerced Into Pleading Guilty, L.A. TIMES 
(Nov. 28, 1999), http://articles.latimes.com/1999/nov/28/opinion/op-38287. According to 
the article, though the new evidence indicated that both men were innocent, each had 
previously pleaded guilty to the fabricated charges to avoid the risk of serving lengthy 
prison sentences if convicted at trial. Id. (“Oscar Peralta (aka Jose Perez) pleaded guilty to 
assault on a police officer in a shooting incident, although he believed that he was framed 
in the case to cover up improper police conduct. Peralta admitted guilt to win a promised 
sentence of time served—10 months in county jail—and avoid the life sentence he faced 
had he been convicted at trial.”); see also Morris B. Hoffman, The Myth of Factual 
Innocence, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 663, 672 (2007) (“Do innocent people plead guilty? Of 
course. Innocent people sometimes even preempt their false guilty pleas by falsely 
confessing, both with and without overbearing interrogation.”). 
256 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 44, at fig.C (stating that in 2009, 96.3 
percent of federal defendants pleaded guilty). 
257 See Baldwin & McConville, supra note 64, at 296 (“[T]he results of our research 
suggest that some defendants who perhaps were innocent, and a larger group who probably 
would have been acquitted had the case gone to trial, were nonetheless induced to plead 
guilty.”); Russell D. Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 66 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 74 (2009) (“Plea bargaining has an innocence problem.”); 
Michael O. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal 
Courts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 293, 295 (1975) (“On the basis of the analysis that follows, I 
conclude that the pressure on defendants to plead guilty in the federal courts has induced a 
high rate of conviction by ‘consent’ in cases in which no conviction would have been 
obtained if there had been a contest.”); Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, 
Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 
1343–44 (1997) (arguing “that America’s criminal justice system creates a significant risk 
that innocent people will be systematically convicted”); Leipond, supra note 235, at 1154 
(“Yet we know that sometimes innocent people plead guilty . . . .”); Robert E. Scott & 
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1949–51 (1992) 
(discussing plea-bargaining’s innocence problem); David L Shapiro, Should a Guilty Plea 
Have Preclusive Effect?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 27, 27 (1984) (discussing the opposition to 
argument that plea bargain should “be preclusive against the person who entered the plea”); 
see also Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 
2295–96 (2006) (arguing a partial ban on plea-bargaining would assist in preventing 
innocent defendants from being forced to plead guilty by forcing prosecutors to allocate 
their limited resources towards only strong cases). 
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least one study has concluded that as many as 27 percent of defendants who plead 
guilty would not have been convicted at trial, though this estimate seems 
exceptionally high. 258  Another more empirically driven study examined DNA 
evidence in capital rape-murder cases and determined that between 3.3 and 5 
percent of those convicted, either through trial or a guilty plea, were factually 
innocent.259 Other studies have placed the number of defendants who plead guilty 
as a result of inducements by the government but who are factually innocent 
between 1.6 percent and 8 percent.260 Taking even the lowest of these estimates, 
the reality is striking and means that in 2009 there were over 1,250 innocent 
defendants forced to falsely admit guilt in the federal system alone.261 Extrapolated 
out to the entire American criminal justice system since 1970, there are 
                                                 
258 See Shapiro, supra note 257, at 45; see also Finkelstein, supra note 257, at 309–10 
(concluding that “at least one-third of all defendants pleading guilty in high-[plea-
bargaining] rate districts would ultimately have escaped conviction if they had refused to 
consent”). 
259  D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual 
Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 778 (2007) (demonstrating 
through analysis of DNA exonerations for capital rape-murders from 1982 to 1989 that the 
minimum factually wrongful conviction rate was 3.3 percent); see also Brandon L. Garrett, 
Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 74 (2008) (noting that nine of the first two 
hundred individuals exonerated by the Innocence Project had pleaded guilty); Scott & 
Stuntz, supra note 257, at 1948 n.134 (“[I]f acquittal is correlated (albeit not perfectly) 
with innocence, and there is an unusually high percentage of acquittals in murder cases, 
then there may be an unusually high number of innocent defendants on trial for murder. 
Since risk aversion should lead many (perhaps most) innocent defendants to plead guilty, 
even given a substantial acquittal rate, the pool of all murder defendants probably includes 
an unusually high number of innocents.”). 
260  See Baldwin & McConville, supra note 64, at 296–98 (discussing plea-
bargaining’s innocence problem in England); Givelber, supra note 257, at 1343–44 
(estimating nearly 8 percent of all convictions would be false if “innocent people plead 
guilty at as high a rate as innocent people are convicted following trial”); id. (“These 
figures represent convictions of innocent people following trial. In this country at least, 90 
percent of convictions are secured through guilty pleas. Here, the criminal justice system is 
truly operating without a compass. If it is modestly assumed that, at the least, there are as 
many total convictions of innocent defendants resulting from pleas as there are from trials, 
one arrives, using the English study percentages, at a figure of 1.6 percent. This figure is a 
slightly higher estimate than that of the criminal justice officials surveyed by Huff, Rattner 
and Sagarin. If the more aggressive assumption is made that innocent people plead guilty at 
as high a rate as innocent people are convicted following trial, then nearly 8% of all 
convictions would be false.”); George C. Thomas III, Two Windows Into Innocence, 7 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 575, 577–78 (2010) (“McConville and Baldwin concluded that two 
percent of the guilty pleas were of doubtful validity. As there were roughly two million 
felony cases filed in 2006, if two percent result in conviction of an innocent defendant, 
40,000 wrongful felony convictions occur per year.”). 
261 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 44, at tbl.10 (stating that in 2009, there 
were 81,372 defendants convicted in the federal system, of which 96.3 percent pleaded 
guilty). 
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conservatively tens of thousands of innocent persons who have been induced to 
plead guilty by overpowering plea bargains. If this is the case, plea-bargaining 
certainly has a significant and unacceptable innocence problem. 
In 1991, John Dixon pleaded guilty to first degree kidnapping, first degree 
robbery, two counts of first degree aggravated sexual assault, and unlawful 
possession of a weapon in the third degree, and was sentenced to forty-five years 
in prison.262 Dixon had not entered a guilty plea because he was remorseful for 
something he had done.263 Dixon pleaded guilty because he was threatened with 
the possibility of a higher sentence if he lost at trial and offered the promise of 
leniency if he relieved the government of its burden at trial.264 In 2001, Dixon’s 
conviction was vacated after DNA testing revealed that he could not have been the 
assailant in the crime.265 A week later, after ten years in prison, he was released.266 
Dixon reminds us of the real people behind the statistics and demonstrates that 
with significant regularity defendants are being compelled to falsely plead guilty to 
offenses they did not commit.267 The question remains, however, is there a remedy 
to plea bargaining’s innocence problem or did, as some believe, the Supreme Court 
grant prosecutors unlimited powers to bargain in Brady? 
 
                                                 
262  The Innocence Project - Know the Cases: Browse Profiles: John Dixon, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/86.php (last visited Feb. 7, 
2012) (describing the story of John Dixon, who pleaded guilty to rape charges for fear he 
would receive a harsher sentence if he proceeded to trial, but was later exonerated by DNA 
evidence). 
263 Id.; see also Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea 
Bargaining Process, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349, 1408 (2004) (“The defendant pleads guilty 
to reduce his punishment; it’s a matter of expediency. Remorse has very little to do with it, 
and judges, who, if anything, are more cynical then [sic] the rest of us, are fully aware of 
that.”). 
264  The Innocence Project - Know the Cases: Browse Profiles: John Dixon, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/86.php (last visited Feb. 7, 
2012); see also Klein, supra note 263, at 1398 (“By the time of the plea allocution it is 
clear that the defendant has decided to take the plea bargain and knows or has been 
instructed by counsel to tell the court that he did indeed do the crime. Predictably, the 
National Institute of Justice survey found that judges rejected guilty pleas in only two 
percent of cases. Since efficiency and speed is the name of the game, it is not unexpected 
that meaningful questioning of the defendant does not occur and it is not surprising that the 
Institute concluded that the plea allocution procedure is ‘close to being a new kind of pious 
fraud.’”); Wright, supra note 76, at 93 (“But when it comes to the defendant's 
‘voluntariness’— the second half of the formula—courts have walked away. The proper 
knowledge, together with a pro forma statement from the defendant that her guilty plea was 
not coerced, normally suffices.”). 
265 The Innocence Project, supra note 264. 
266 Id. 
267 See id.; Leipold, supra note 235, at 1154 (“[S]ometimes the prosecutor offers such 
a generous discount for admitting guilt that the defendant feels he simply can’t take the 
chance of going to trial.”). 
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B.  The Constitutional Limits of the Great Compromise  
and a Litmus Test for the Brady Safety-Valve 
 
While the Brady decision signaled a shift away from wholesale rejection of 
bargained justice, it contained an important limitation regarding how far the Court 
would permit prosecutors to venture in attempting to induce defendants to plead 
guilty. In the concluding paragraphs of the decision, the Supreme Court discussed 
its vision for the utilization of plea-bargaining in the criminal system.268 Plea-
bargaining was a tool for use only in cases where the evidence was overwhelming 
and where the defendant, unlikely to succeed at trial, might benefit from the 
opportunity to bargain for a reduced sentence.269 Plea-bargaining, however, was 
not to be used to overwhelm defendants into pleading guilty where their guilt was 
in question.270 
 
For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of 
pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious—his 
exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, 
and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are 
also advantages—the more promptly imposed punishment after an 
admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of 
punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and 
prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a 
substantial issue of the defendant’s guilt or in which there is substantial 
doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof.271 
 
According to the Court, if the government were to begin offering significant 
incentives to defendants whose guilt was uncertain in an effort to motivate them to 
plead guilty, defendants who might in fact be innocent, the Court would be forced 
to reconsider its approval of the plea-bargaining system.272 
 
This is not to say that guilty plea convictions hold no hazards for the 
innocent or that the methods of taking guilty pleas presently employed in 
this country are necessarily valid in all respects. This mode of conviction 
is no more foolproof than full trials to the court or to the jury. 
Accordingly, we take great precautions against unsound results, and we 
should continue to do so, whether conviction is by plea or by trial. We 
would have serious doubts about this case if the encouragement of guilty 
pleas by offers of leniency substantially increased the likelihood that 
                                                 
268 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756–58 (1970). 
269 See id. at 752. 
270 See id. at 750, 752. 
271 Id. at 752 (emphasis added). 
272 See id. at 757–58. 
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defendants, advised by competent counsel, would falsely condemn 
themselves.273 
 
While the Supreme Court was willing to permit a compromise in the interests of 
justice and judicial economy in 1970, it also created a safety-valve.274 Safety-
valves are intended to relieve pressure when forces within a machine become too 
great and, thereby, preserve the integrity of the machine.275 The Brady safety-valve 
serves just such a purpose by placing a limit on the amount of pressure that can 
constitutionally be placed on defendants to plead guilty. According to the Court, 
however, should plea-bargaining become so common that prosecutors offer deals 
to all defendants, including those whose guilt is in question, and the incentives to 
bargain become so overpowering that even innocent defendants acquiesce, then the 
Brady safety-valve will have failed and the plea-bargaining machine will have 
ventured into the realm of unconstitutionality.276 
Interestingly, the Brady decision is not the only Supreme Court case from the 
1970’s that discusses the Court’s concerns regarding innocent defendants and that 
makes mention of a safety-valve or threshold regarding acceptable incentives to 
bargain.277 In Alford, the Court stated that Alford plea agreements must only be 
                                                 
273 Id. The sentiment that innocent defendants should not be encouraged to plead 
guilty has been echoed by academics. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 236, at 1382 (“Even if 
innocent defendants want to plead guilty, the law should not go out of its way to promote 
these unjust results.”); Leipold, supra note 235, at 1158 (supporting the statements of 
Stephanos Bibas regarding innocent defendants and plea bargaining). 
274 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 757–58. 
275  Safety Valve, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
safety%20valve (last visited Feb. 7, 2012) (defining safety valve as “an automatic escape 
or relief valve,” “an outlet for pent-up energy or emotion,” or “something that relieves the 
pressure of overcrowding”).  
276 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 757–58. 
277  See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363–65 (1978) (discussing plea 
bargains and noting there are “undoubtedly constitutional limits” to the exercise of plea 
bargaining); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–39 (1970) (holding as valid a guilty 
plea made to avoid the death penalty and discussing when a court should accept guilty 
pleas”). Even the 1968 ABA report regarding plea-bargaining accepted the premise that 
plea-bargaining should be for defendants whose guilt is demonstrated by overwhelming 
evidence, thus freeing resources for the trial of those defendants whose guilty is less 
certain. 
 
[A] high proportion of pleas of guilty and nolo contendere does benefit the 
system. Such pleas tend to limit the trial process to deciding real disputes and, 
consequently, to reduce the need for funds and personnel. If the number of 
judges, courtrooms, court personnel and counsel for prosecution and defense 
were to be increased substantially [if necessitated by a decreased use of plea 
bargains], the funds necessary for such increases might be diverted from 
elsewhere in the criminal justice process. Moreover, the limited use of the trial 
process for those cases in which the defendant has grounds for contesting the 
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utilized in cases where the evidence regarding actual guilt is strong and sufficient 
to negate the defendant’s claim of innocence.278 Where there is doubt as to the 
defendant’s culpability, the case must be sent to trial and no plea bargain may be 
struck so as to protect the “innocent and. . . . insur[e] that guilty pleas are a product 
of free and intelligent choice.”279 Unfortunately, despite this clear standard from 
the Supreme Court, Kerry Max Cook’s false confession of guilt was accepted even 
though the offer itself signaled the prosecution’s belief that it would lose at trial.280 
In 1978, the Supreme Court addressed plea-bargaining once more in 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,281 and, once again, expressed concern regarding innocent 
defendants. Paul Hayes was indicted on a charge of uttering a forged instrument, 
an offense under Kentucky law punishable by two to ten years in prison.282 During 
plea negotiations, the prosecution stated that if Hayes pleaded guilty, he would 
recommend a sentence of five years. 283  If he did not “save the court the 
inconvenience and necessity of a trial,” however, the prosecution threatened to re-
indict Hayes under a habitual offender law that carried a life sentence.284 Hayes 
refused to plead guilty and, as a result, was re-indicted, found guilty at trial, and 
sentenced to life in prison.285 
In holding that the prosecutor in the Bordenkircher case had not acted 
inappropriately, the Supreme Court began by clearly stating that “[t]o punish a 
person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process 
violation of the most basic sort.”286 The Court continued, however, “in the ‘give-
and-take’ of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation 
so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution’s offer.”287 As long 
                                                 
matter of guilt aids in preserving the meaningfulness of the presumption of 
innocence.  
 
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL Justice, supra note 77, at 2. 
278 See Alford, 400 U.S. at 37–38. 
279 Id. at 38 n.10; see also Bibas, supra note 236, at 1382 (“It should go without 
saying that it is wrong to convict innocent defendants. Thus, the law should hinder these 
convictions instead of facilitating them through Alford and nolo contendere pleas.”). 
280 See infra notes 237–255 and accompanying text (discussing the Kerry Max Cook 
case). 
281 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. 357. 
282 Id. at 358. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. at 358–59. 
285 Id. at 359. 
286 Id. at 363. 
287 Id.; see also Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 225 (1978) (“Finally, we are 
unconvinced that the New Jersey statutory pattern exerts such a powerful influence to 
coerce inaccurate pleas non vult that it should be deemed constitutionally suspect. There is 
no suggestion here that Corbitt was not well counseled or that he misunderstood the 
choices that were placed before him. Here, as in Bordenkircher, the State did not trespass 
on the defendant’s rights ‘so long as the accused [was] free to accept or reject’ the choice 
presented to him by the State that is, to go to trial and face the risk of life imprisonment or 
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as the incentives to bargain are sufficiently reasonable and the defendant retains 
this sense of freedom, the Court determined that it is unlikely an innocent 
defendant would be “driven to false self-condemnation.”288 Of course, the Supreme 
Court was wrong regarding its estimation of the impact of prosecutors’ offers on 
innocent defendants. As John Dixon demonstrates, it is very likely that innocent 
defendants will plead guilty in return for the incredible incentives currently being 
offered by the prosecution, incentives that strip away a defendant’s ability to freely 
decide whether to accept or reject the government’s advances.289 
While the Supreme Court in Brady, Alford, and Bordenkircher noted that plea 
bargains were only intended for cases with strong evidentiary support and not as a 
tool to induce all defendants, including the innocent, to plead guilty, modern day 
plea-bargaining is clearly at odds with this central edict of the Supreme Court’s 
great compromise of 1970. 290  Today, defendants whose guilt is uncertain are 
offered plea bargains as often, if not more often, than those for whom the evidence 
is particularly strong.291 Not only are these defendants of questionable guilt offered 
                                                 
to seek acceptance of a non vult plea and the imposition of the lesser penalty authorized by 
law.”). 
288 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (“Indeed, acceptance of the basic legitimacy of 
plea bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any notion that a guilty plea is involuntary 
in a constitutional sense simply because it is the end result of the bargaining process.”). 
289 See supra notes 262–267 and accompanying text (discussing the John Dixon case). 
290 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 
1969, 1969 (1992) (“Persons at risk of unjust conviction may prefer a certain (but low) 
punishment in a plea bargain to the risk of conviction and high punishment after trial.”); 
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1979 (1992) 
(“[P]lea bargaining seriously impairs the public interest in effective punishment of crime 
and in accurate separation of the guilty from the innocent.”). Interestingly, in a 1980 article, 
Thomas R. McCoy and Michael J. Mirra argued that “plea bargaining is constitutionally 
defensible . . . . [but] demands the development of guidelines expressly designed to ensure 
that the incremental inaccuracy of plea bargaining does not exceed the limits tolerated by 
procedural due process.” McCoy & Mirra, supra note 224, at 925–26. As demonstrated by 
plea-bargaining’s innocence problem, no guidelines sufficient to satisfy this need were ever 
created. 
291 See John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea 
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 449 (2001) (The prosecutor “will offer greater sentencing 
concessions in those cases where conviction is less likely, and fewer concessions where she 
is more confident of conviction."); Gazal-Ayal, supra note 257, at 2298–99 (“When the 
case is weak, meaning when the probability that a trial would result in conviction is 
relatively small, [the prosecutor] can assure a conviction by offering the defendant a 
substantial discount—a discount big enough to compensate him for foregoing the 
possibility of being found not guilty.”); Hessick & Saujani, supra note 224, at 199 
(“Assuming the innocent defendant is more likely to be acquitted at trial, the prosecutor has 
much higher incentives to enter a plea agreement with the innocent defendant than with a 
guilty defendant because the prosecutor perceives the innocence as a lack of evidence.”); 
Yin, supra note 90, at 443 (“Curiously, the arena of plea bargaining pits the concepts of 
duress and consideration against each other: a large sentencing differential makes it more 
likely that a defendant is coerced into pleading guilty, and yet it also increases the benefit 
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plea bargains, their bargains are often more generous and, therefore, more 
irresistible than those offered to defendants against whom the government believes 
it has a strong chance of success at trial.292 As a result, while the Supreme Court in 
1970 did not desire that plea-bargaining be utilized to induce the innocent to plead 
guilty, it is precisely these defendants who are placed under the most severe 
pressure to confess today.293 
It is important to note that while plea bargaining’s innocence problem serves 
as an indication that we have gone beyond the types of incentives and persuasions 
to plead guilty permitted by the Brady safety-valve, the Supreme Court did not 
intend that this threshold on pressure apply only to the innocent. Rather, the 
innocent serve as a litmus test for plea-bargaining more generally. If prosecutors 
are offering incentives that are sufficient to force innocent defendants to plead 
guilty, these same types of incentives are equally unconstitutional when offered to 
guilty defendants because both sets of defendants are involuntarily entering their 
pleas. 
Recall that while Brady drastically changed the landscape of American 
criminal justice by permitting plea-bargaining, it retained the requirement that all 
pleas be “voluntary.” Clearly, the Brady court did not intend “voluntary” in the 
plea-bargaining context to retain the restrictive meaning it had held when pleas of 
guilt were considered legally identical to confessions, because such a definition 
would make almost every offer of leniency impermissible. Instead, “voluntary” 
took on a new, although woefully undefined, meaning. 294  To discern what 
“voluntary” meant after Brady one must examine the use of this term throughout 
Supreme Court precedent.295 In so doing, one learns that the term has less to do 
with the type of incentives offered and more to do with the effect of such offers on 
defendants. This is why plea-bargaining’s innocence problem serves as a litmus 
test for voluntariness generally. 
                                                 
offered in exchange for the guilty plea.”); see also Finkelstein, supra note 257, at 311–12 
(“Since it appears that prosecutors’ stronger cases tended to be selected for guilty pleas in 
the historical period, while weaker than average cases are selected with greater frequency 
today [(1975)], a refocusing of plea bargaining on stronger cases might improve the 
statistical picture without adding materially (if at all) to the number of trials.”). 
292 See infra note 291. 
293 See Covey, supra note 257, at 74, 79–80 (“Plea bargaining has an innocence 
problem. . . . In short, as long as the prosecutor is willing and able to discount plea prices to 
reflect resource savings, regardless of guilt or innocence, pleading guilty is the defendant’s 
dominant strategy. As a result, non-frivolous accusations—not proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt—is all that is necessary to establish legal guilt. This latter point forms the root of 
plea-bargaining’s ‘innocence problem,’ which refers here not merely to the fact that 
innocent people plead guilty, but that the economics of plea bargaining drives them to do 
so.”). 
294 See supra notes 198–218 and accompanying text (discussing Brady v. United 
States). 
295 See supra Part I. 
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Cases dating back to the eighteenth century, such as Rex v. Warickshall 
(1783), imparted a central tenet that has remained true throughout modern times—
admissions of guilt forced from defendants by overwhelming incentives strip such 
defendants of free will and must be discredited.296 In the earliest examples of 
American case law regarding guilty pleas and confessions, the Court trumpets this 
same overarching theme of free will. In cases such as Hallinger v. Davis (1892) 
and Bram v. United States (1897), the Court specifically required confessions and 
pleas of guilty to be more than just voluntary—they had to be entered “freely.”297 
By the mid-twentieth century, in cases such as Walker v. Johnson (1941), Waley v. 
Johnson (1942), and United States v. Jackson (1968), the Supreme Court began 
using the term “coercive” to describe guilty pleas and confessions that were not 
given freely, but the intent was the same.298 After all, since the fifteenth century 
“coercive” has meant to dominate by force or threat.299 By 1962, in Machibroda v. 
United States,300 the Supreme Court was once again drawing a clear line between 
permissible pleas and those “induced by promises or threats which deprive [the 
plea] of the character of a voluntary act . . . .”301 Perhaps no case better summarizes 
the concept that guilty pleas must be entered into freely than the first case 
discussed in this Article—the case of Beatrice Lynumn.302  The Lynumn Court 
                                                 
296 See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 12–13. 
297 Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 324 (1892); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 
532, 542–43, 544–48 (1897) (“But a confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and 
voluntary: that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats of violence, nor obtained by 
any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper 
influence . . . for the law cannot measure the force of the influence used, or decide upon its 
effect upon the mind of the prisoner . . . .” (quoting 3 RUSSELL ON CRIMES 478 (6th ed.))). 
298 See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942) (“For a conviction on a plea of 
guilty coerced by a federal law enforcement officer is no more consistent with due process 
than a conviction supported by a coerced confession.”); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 
286–87 (1941) (“If he did not voluntarily waive his right to counsel, or if he was deceived 
or coerced by the prosecutor into entering a guilty plea, he was deprived of a constitutional 
right.”); c.f. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968) (“[T]he evil in the federal 
statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply that it 
needlessly encourages them. A procedure need not be inherently coercive in order that it be 
held to impose an impermissible burden upon the assertion of a constitutional right.”). 
299 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 240 (11th ed. 2003) (definition 
of coerce). 
300 Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962). 
301  Id. at 493 (“There can be no doubt that, if the allegations contained in the 
petitioner’s motion and affidavit are true, he is entitled to have his sentence vacated. A 
guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the character of a 
voluntary act, is void. . . . Like a verdict of a jury[, a plea of guilty] is conclusive. . . . Out 
of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty 
shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full 
understanding of the consequences.”). 
302 See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); see also supra notes 2–22 and 
accompanying text. 
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stated, where the defendant’s “will was overborne at the time [s]he confessed, . . . 
[the] confession cannot be deemed ‘the product of a rational intellect and a free 
will.’”303 That Lynumn had a choice when confronted with the possibility of losing 
her children was clear, but, as the Supreme Court recognized, the choice was 
illusory.304 The incentive to bargain, which she believed meant retaining custody of 
her children, was so powerful as to be overbearing and remove any elements of 
freedom in her decision. Her confession, though gladly offered, was nonetheless 
involuntary.305 
When the Supreme Court addressed plea-bargaining in Brady, almost two 
centuries of precedent established that the incentives offered in return for a plea 
must not be so powerful as to remove the defendant’s ability to consider the choice 
and act with “free will.”306  Though the Court permitted a major shift in plea 
bargaining policy in Brady, it certainly did not remove this requirement. In fact, 
Brady, Alford, and Bordenkircher all specifically retained the threshold 
requirement of free will by continuing to require that all pleas be entered into 
voluntarily. 307  In Brady, the Court stated, there may be no “mental coercion 
overbearing the will of the defendant.”308 The same year, in Alford, the Court 
reiterated that guilty pleas must be “free and intelligent,” not irrational acts forced 
                                                 
303 Lynum, 372 U.S. at 534 (“We think it clear that a confession made under such 
circumstances must be deemed not voluntary, but coerced.”). 
304 In his article regarding judicial intervention in plea bargaining, Richard Klein 
briefly discusses the similarities between coerced confessions and the activities prohibited 
by Miranda v. Arizona. See Klein, supra note 263, at 1419 (“This is an inherently coercive 
atmosphere; one which could well cause even an innocent individual to realize that his 
most sensible option, indeed perhaps his only option, is to take the plea deal that will never 
be offered again. The setting and the pressures are strikingly similar to those the Supreme 
Court found to be intolerable in Miranda v. Arizona, where the entire thrust of the suspect’s 
interrogation ‘was to put the defendant in such an emotional state as to impair his capacity 
for rational judgment. . . . [T]he compelling atmosphere of the in-custody interrogation, and 
not an independent decision on his part, caused the defendant to speak.’”). 
305 See supra notes 2–22 and accompanying text (discussing the Lynumn confession). 
306 See supra notes 296–305 and accompanying text.  
307 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 
U.S. 25, 37–39 (1970); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). Even the 
American Bar Association report from 1968 seemed to adhere to this basic tenet of plea 
bargaining as it was then understood. See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 29 (“The court should not accept a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere without first determining that the plea is voluntary. . . . The court should [] 
address the defendant personally and determine whether any other promises or any force or 
threats were used to obtain the plea.”). 
308 Brady, 397 U.S. at 750 (emphasis added) (“Of course, the agents of the State may 
not produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing 
the will of the defendant.”). 
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from the defendant.309 Finally, eight years later, in Bordenkircher, the Court stated, 
the key criteria for acceptance of guilty pleas is the determination that the 
defendant, in making his or her decision, was “free to accept or reject the 
prosecution’s offer.”310 “Voluntary,” therefore, even after Brady, means that the 
incentives offered to defendants may not be so coercive as to overbear the 
individual’s ability to act freely and decide in a rational manner whether to accept 
or reject the government’s offer. 
When one considers this definition of “voluntary,” the reason the Supreme 
Court created a litmus test regarding innocent defendants to monitor the operation 
of the Brady safety-valve becomes evident. Innocent defendants serve as the most 
efficient monitor of whether defendants are being afforded the opportunity to 
exercise their free will and decide in a rational manner whether to accept or reject a 
plea bargain. As the Bordenkircher Court stated, innocent defendants should not be 
“driven to false self-condemnation” by the plea-bargaining system. 311  Instead, 
innocent defendants should challenge the government in most cases and, though 
trials are not perfect, exercise their right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt before a jury. Where, however, innocent defendants in significant numbers 
are not exercising these rights, but are being coerced to plead guilty, such acts 
serve as a strong indication that the Brady safety-valve has failed and defendants, 
both innocent and guilty, are being overborne by unconstitutional incentives.312 
It is important to note that just because plea-bargaining has an innocence 
problem, it does not necessarily follow that all plea bargains are unconstitutional. 
Rather, the innocence litmus test serves only to alert the Court that plea-bargaining 
as an institution has begun to drift into impermissible territory. For instance, few 
would argue that a defendant offered six years in prison for pleading guilty or 
seven years in prison if he or she losses at trial would be stripped of the ability to 
make a rational and free decision because of the polarity of these options. But, 
perhaps, the offer in the Lea Fastow case does represent an impermissible 
inducement. Did Lea Fastow really have a choice after she was presented with her 
                                                 
309 Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 n.10 (cautioning against accepting “pleas coupled with 
claims of innocence” without a factual basis for the plea, so as to protect the “innocent and 
. . . insur[e] that guilty pleas are a product of free and intelligent choice . . . .”). 
310 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (“[I]n the ‘give-and-take’ of plea bargaining, there 
is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or 
reject the prosecution’s offer.”). 
311 Id. (“Indeed, acceptance of the basic legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily 
implies rejection of any notion that a guilty plea is involuntary in a constitutional sense 
simply because it is the end result of the bargaining process.”). 
312 It is important to note that this Article is not arguing that innocent defendants 
should never be permitted to plead guilty. In rare cases, a defendant who is innocent may 
nonetheless have an exceedingly small chance of success at trial because of the available 
evidence. An example would include a case involving a mistaken, yet convincing, 
eyewitness identification. These defendants should be given the opportunity to plead guilty 
in return for a benefit. Where significant numbers of defendants are pleading guilty, 
however, this serves as an indication of a larger and more systemic problem. 
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options? Did Beatrice Lynumn have such a choice? The distinction, therefore, 
between plea bargains that are permitted by Brady and those that violate the great 
compromise of 1970 is the size of the sentencing differential in each case. At some 
point, the sentencing differential becomes so large that it destroys the defendant’s 
ability to act freely and decide in a rational manner whether to accept or reject the 
government’s offer. The solution to the failure of the Brady safety-valve, therefore, 
is to limit the size of the sentencing differentials used to induce defendants to plead 
guilty.313 
It should come as no surprise that the Brady safety-valve is failing and pleas 
are being entered involuntarily by both innocent and guilty defendants, because 
prosecutors have been gaining increased powers to bargain for over half a 
century.314 As discussed in Part I.B, as prosecutors’ powers to bargain increase, so 
too does their ability to create startling sentencing differentials as inducements for 
defendants to plead guilty.315 Consider for a moment the sentencing differential for 
Lea Fastow: ten years in prison and parentless children versus five months in jail 
and a guarantee that one parent will always be at home. 
While the Supreme Court did not discuss the relationship between voluntary 
plea-bargaining and sentencing differentials in its Brady opinion, the 1968 
American Bar Association report on plea-bargaining, which the Court cited with 
approval, had some very noteworthy comments. 
 
Assuming that two defendants have engaged in the same conduct under 
essentially the same circumstances and that the usual presentence 
information as to the two does not materially differ, is it proper to give a 
somewhat lower sentence to one defendant because he has consented to 
enter a plea of guilty? . . . [I]t appears that most judges consider such 
leniency proper if the sentence disparity is not unreasonable.316  
                                                 
313 As various commentators have noted, abolishing plea-bargaining in its entirety 
would not only crush the existing criminal justice system, it would eliminate a system that 
is beneficial in many ways for defendants, prosecutors, and courts. See, e.g., Covey, supra 
note 257, at 83–86 (noting that abolishing plea-bargaining does not solve the innocence 
problem, and does not improve the quality or accuracy of trials); Gazal-Ayal, supra note 
257, at 2299 (“As many scholars have shown, a total ban on plea bargaining is hardly 
feasible in the overloaded American criminal justice system.”). 
314 See supra Part I.B (discussing the increases in prosecutorial power during the 
twentieth century). 
315 See supra Part I.B; see also Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea 
Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1238–41 (2008) (arguing that 
large sentencing differential forced some innocent defendants to accept plea bargains); 
Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 
54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 204 (2006) (“Two features of our current federal system are 
especially concerning in this respect—harsh sentences and steep discounts for pleading 
guilty. Together, they may induce even defendants with good odds of prevailing at trial to 
accept a plea bargain.”). 
316 See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 37–38 
(emphasis added). 
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Thus, even the ABA’s report praising plea-bargaining in 1968 made clear that 
when sentencing disparities reach unreasonable levels they reflect an unacceptable 
type of bargained justice.317 The Supreme Court agreed and, therefore, while it 
embraced plea-bargaining in the Brady decision, it also created a safety-valve and 
a litmus test to monitor its success. As the Court understood in 1970, one can 
hardly be expected to make a rational and free decision regarding an offer to plead 
guilty when the differences between the offered leniency and the threat of 
punishment are staggering and life altering. 
Various scholars have discussed the means by which the size of sentencing 
differentials may be limited.318 Some have proposed requiring judges to reject plea 
bargains that contain significant benefits,319 while others have argued for “fixed 
discounts” for those who admit their guilt in court.320  Regardless of how one 
achieves reduced sentencing differentials, however, such reforms are key to 
eliminating plea-bargaining’s innocence problem and, at the same time, ensuring 
that plea bargains are entered into “voluntarily” by defendants as required by the 
Supreme Court’s great compromise of 1970. 
Exactly how small sentencing differentials must be to ensure they do not exert 
pressure in excess of that permitted by the Brady safety-valve is still unclear and 
outside the scope of this Article.321 What is clear, however, is that the sentencing 
differentials being offered in a significant number of cases today are too large. As 
explained under the express terms of Brady, defendants whose guilt at trial is 
almost assured should not require large sentencing differentials to plead guilty and 
defendants whose culpability is questionable should not be offered such benefits as 
an inducement to waive their right to walk free unless proven guilty by a jury. To 
offer staggering sentencing differentials to all defendants violates the spirit of the 
                                                 
317 See id. 
318 See, e.g., Covey, supra note 315, at 1241–43 (discussing the potential of using a 
fixed-discount system such as “plea-based ceilings” to limit sentencing differentials); 
Gazal-Ayal, supra note 257, at 2299–2300 (discussing the possibility of a “partial ban” that 
“would allow prosecutors to extract guilty pleas when defendants are almost certainly 
guilty, while forcing them to conduct jury trials when they bring more questionable 
charges”). 
319 See, e.g., Gazal-Ayal, supra note 257, at 2299–2300 (“The best way to cope with 
the innocence problem is to allow plea bargaining only in strong cases and to ban plea 
bargaining in weak cases. . . . How would this partial ban work? . . . Courts only have to 
reject plea bargains that result in substantial concessions.”). 
320 See Covey, supra note 315, at 1241 (“Fixed discounts regularize the guilty-plea 
process by establishing a fixed and nonnegotiable discount for pleading guilty.”). Covey 
goes on to discuss the advantages to the plea bargaining system that might result from 
limiting the size of sentencing differentials. See id. at 1245–46. 
321 The author is currently engaged in research designed to determine the impact of 
particular sentencing differentials on defendants and ascertain how the relative size of 
differentials influences the likelihood that innocent defendants will plead guilty. The results 
of this research will be published in a future article that will draw from the definition of 
“voluntariness” proposed herein. 
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Supreme Court’s great compromise and represents an abandonment of the 
fundamental tenets underlying the Constitutional rights afforded to all who are 
accused of committing a crime. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
If any number of attorneys were asked in 2004 whether Lea Fastow’s plea 
bargain in the Enron case was constitutional, the majority would respond with a 
simple word—Brady. Yet while the 1970 Supreme Court decision Brady v. United 
States authorized plea-bargaining as a form of American justice, the case also 
contained a vital caveat that has been overlooked by scholars, practitioners, and 
courts for almost forty years. Brady contains a safety-valve that caps the amount of 
pressure that may be asserted against defendants by prohibiting prosecutors from 
offering incentives in return for guilty pleas that are so coercive as to overbear 
defendants’ abilities to act freely. Further, as a means to discern whether the 
safety-valve fails in the future and prosecutors are offering unconstitutional 
incentives, the Brady Court in 1970 created a litmus test regarding innocent 
defendants. The Court stated that should the plea-bargaining system begin to 
operate in a manner resulting in a significant number of innocent defendants 
pleading guilty the Court would be forced to reexamine the constitutionality of 
bargained justice. That plea-bargaining today has a significant innocence problem 
indicates that the Brady safety-valve has failed and, as a result, the constitutionality 
of modern day plea bargaining is in great doubt.322 
                                                 
322  While plea-bargaining began its rise in the mid-1800s, relatively few plea 
bargaining cases reached the Supreme Court until the mid-1900s. There is a procedural 
reason for this phenomenon. Those who are coerced into accepting plea bargains, the 
innocent and the guilty alike, are happy merely for the chance to receive a benefit rather 
than risk the astounding penalties they believe await them if they lose at trial. 
